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INTRODUCTION 
magine a country with a law that mirrors Title VII.1 Suppose that an 
employer in that country has put up posters stating that persons of a 
certain race “need not apply” for pay increases.2 A worker of that race 
requests a pay raise and the employer rejects the request. The worker 
                                                                                                             
 *  Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. Email: scam-
pos@law.miami.edu. Phone: (305) 284-5899. This Article is a contribution to a symposi-
um on the Globalization of the U.S. Litigation Model held at Brooklyn Law School. 
Many thanks to the symposium participants for their comments. This Article also benefit-
ed from comments I received from workshop participants at Cardozo, Miami, and Ameri-
can law schools. I want to thank Caroline Bradley, Lester Brickman, Zanita Fenton, Myr-
iam Gilles, Jim Greiner, Pat Gudridge, Steve Halpert, Fred McChesney, Arad Reisberg, 
David Rosenberg, Stewart Sterk, Markus Wagner, and Adam Zimmerman for their help-
ful comments on previous drafts. Lauren White and Alyssa Karp provided excellent re-
search assistance. All errors are my own. 
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2006). 
 2. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural 
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 459–60 (2001) (contrasting obvious, “first genera-
I 
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then asserts a disparate treatment claim against the employer for a “pat-
tern or practice” of racial discrimination.3 
The worker would like to bring a class action because her damages, as 
well as the damages for all other affected workers, would be small. But 
to proceed as a class action in that country, the worker must first prove 
that each member of the class was injured by the alleged discriminatory 
practice. The worker must do so even though, to prevail on the claim, 
Title VII does not require plaintiffs “to offer evidence that each person 
for whom it will ultimately seek relief was a victim of the employer’s 
discriminatory policy.”4 Proving the fact of injury on a classwide basis 
may be difficult because some class members may not have deserved a 
pay increase in the absence of the discriminatory practice. 
The requirement of proof of classwide injury, in effect, prevents the 
worker’s class action from being certified, even though the employer’s 
conduct is manifestly unlawful, and the class would certainly prevail on 
the merits. Given the small claims of each of the class members, the re-
quirement likely prevents all actions from being filed. As it turns out, this 
requirement applies to class actions in the United States. 
This symposium addresses the spread of the U.S. litigation model to 
other jurisdictions, and arguably there is no procedure more American 
than the class action.5 Recently, however, other countries have adopted 
class actions or similar collective procedures.6 This Article discusses the 
                                                                                                             
tion” forms of discrimination, such as signs stating “Irish need not apply,” from more 
complex, “second generation” forms of discrimination, such as unconscious bias). 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race”); see 
also Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977) (defining dispar-
ate treatment pattern-or-practice claims). 
 4. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360–61 (noting that after a “pattern-or-practice” has been 
found to violate Title VII, “a district court must usually conduct additional proceedings 
after the liability phase to determine the scope of individual relief”). 
 5. Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation across the Atlantic and the Future of 
American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009) [hereinafter Nagareda, Aggre-
gate Litigation across the Atlantic] (noting “several exceptional features of the U.S. civil 
justice system,” including “class actions”); Edward F. Sherman, Group Litigation under 
Foreign Legal Systems: Variations and Alternatives to American Actions, 52 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 401, 401 (2002) (“The class action is a uniquely American procedural device.”). 
 6. Manuel A. Gomez, Collective Redress in Latin America: The Regulation of Class 
Actions and Other Forms of Aggregate and Group Litigation for the Protection of Con-
sumer Rights, in L’ART. 140 BIS DEL CODICE DEL CONSUMO: L’AZIONE DI CLASSE 265 
(Lorenzo Mezzasoma & Francesco Rizzo eds., 2011) (It.) (discussing class actions and 
similar procedures in Latin America); Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation across the Atlan-
tic, supra note 5, at 4 (noting recent implementation of procedures “within the broad 
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merits of the class action both here and abroad, but takes an American 
focus. It examines a recent requirement of U.S. class action doctrine il-
lustrated by the hypothetical above—proof of classwide injury. The Arti-
cle argues that the requirement reveals misunderstandings about the class 
action. It then uses these misunderstandings to suggest factors that both 
the United States and other jurisdictions should consider in implementing 
class actions or similar procedures. 
Federal courts in the United States have recently required proof of 
“classwide injury” to certify a class action for damage remedies.7 Proof 
of classwide injury is generally understood as proof that the defendant 
injured every member of the class.8 Such proof does not have to show the 
amount of damages for each plaintiff. Instead, it only has to show that 
each plaintiff was in fact injured by the defendant’s alleged unlawful 
conduct.9 
Proof of classwide injury is referred to in antitrust litigation as proof of 
classwide or common “impact,”10 and in securities fraud and Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) fraud litigation as 
                                                                                                             
rubric of ‘aggregate litigation,’” such as “English group litigation orders” and “Italian 
class actions”). Many of the contributions to this symposium discuss in great detail col-
lective procedures in different countries. 
 7. E.g., Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 572 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial 
of class certification since plaintiffs “cannot prove classwide injury with proof common 
to the class”); Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 187 
(3d Cir. 2001) (finding that there was no proof of classwide “injury” since “[w]hether a 
class member suffered economic loss from a given securities transaction would require 
proof of the circumstances surrounding each trade, the available alternative prices, and 
the state of mind of each investor at the time the trade was requested”). 
 8. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311–12 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(“[T]he task for plaintiffs at class certification is to demonstrate that the element of anti-
trust impact is capable of proof at trial through evidence that is common to the class ra-
ther than individual to its members.”). 
 9. In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 159 F.R.D. 682, 694 (D. Minn. 1995) (“[T]he issue 
in the common impact analysis is the fact, not the amount, of injury.”). 
 10. E.g., Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311 (“Importantly, individual injury (also 
known as antitrust impact) is an element of the cause of action; to prevail on the merits, 
every class member must prove at least some antitrust impact resulting from the alleged 
violation.” (citing Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 454 (3d Cir. 1977))); In re 
New Motor Vehicles Can. Export Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2008) (“The 
real dispute revolved around whether common evidence could be used to prove the im-
pact of the alleged conspiracy on U.S. consumers (‘common impact’).”); see also id. at 
19 n.18 (noting that “[t]he element of injury in the antitrust context is often referred to as 
‘impact’ or ‘fact of damage,’” (quoting Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d 309, 
317 n.18 (5th Cir. 1978))). 
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classwide proof of “transaction causation.”11 Courts have similarly re-
quired proof of classwide “specific causation” in mass tort cases,12 as 
well as proof of the common “glue” that injured the plaintiffs in em-
ployment discrimination cases.13 In all contexts proof of classwide injury 
is referred to as common proof of the “fact” of injury.14 
Courts generally require proof of classwide injury to satisfy the “pre-
dominance” requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), 
which requires plaintiffs seeking to certify a class to show that “the ques-
tions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members.”15 In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Dukes,16 decided this past term, the Supreme Court suggested that 
“significant proof” of classwide injury may be required to satisfy the 
“commonality” requirement of Rule 23(a)(2), which only requires a 
showing that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.”17 
                                                                                                             
 11. E.g., McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 222 (2d Cir. 2008); New-
ton, 259 F.3d at 172 (noting, in the context of civil RICO fraud litigation, that “[r]eliance, 
or transaction causation, establishes that but for the fraudulent misrepresentation, the 
investor would not have purchased or sold the security” in securities fraud litigation). But 
see Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008) (holding that plaintiffs 
are not required to prove reliance to assert a civil RICO claim, but still requiring a show-
ing of proximate cause). 
 12. E.g., In re Vioxx Products Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 462 (E.D. La. 2006) 
(finding a lack of predominance despite common issues of general causation, since “each 
individual plaintiff must meet his or her own burden of medical causation” (quoting 
Steering Comm. v. Exxon Mobil Corp. 461 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir. 2006))). Cf. Amchem 
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624 (1997) (finding no predominance in settle-
ment class action involving asbestos claims “given the greater number of questions pecu-
liar to the several categories of class members,” including injury). 
 13. Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2545 (2011). 
 14. E.g., New Motor Vehicles, 522 F.3d at 20 (noting that “[i]n antitrust class actions, 
common issues do not predominate if the fact of antitrust violation and the fact of anti-
trust impact cannot be established through common proof”). 
 15. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see also New Motor Vehicles, 522 F.3d at 20 (requiring 
“common proof” of “antitrust impact” to satisfy the predominance requirement). Some 
courts also require proof of classwide injury to satisfy the “superiority” requirement of 
Rule 23(b)(3), although here I will focus on the predominance requirement. FED. R. CIV. 
P. 23(b)(3) (requiring, for purposes of class certification, a showing “that a class action is 
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controver-
sy”); Newton, 259 F.3d at 192 (“Because injury determinations must be made on an indi-
vidual basis in this case, adjudicating the claims as a class will not reduce litigation or 
save scarce judicial resources. Under these circumstances, plaintiffs fail to satisfy the 
superiority standard.”). 
 16. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. 2541. 
 17. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2); see also Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2545 (holding that the 
commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) requires “significant proof that an employer 
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Unlike Rule 23(b)(3), which defines a residual category that mainly ap-
plies to class actions seeking monetary remedies, Rule 23(a)(2) is a pre-
requisite for all class actions.18 
This Article examines proof of classwide injury as a requirement for 
certification of a class action. Although the requirement has not attracted 
much scholarly attention, most scholars, such as the late Richard Na-
gareda, have concluded that proof of classwide injury should be a pre-
requisite for class certification.19 In fact, the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart 
quoted a seminal article by Nagareda to support its view that the “com-
monality” requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) not only requires “common 
questions,” but proof of “common answers” as to injury: 
What matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of common 
“questions”—even in droves—but, rather the capacity of a classwide 
proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of 
the litigation. Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have 
the potential to impede the generation of common answers.20 
The Wal-Mart Court did not find sufficient proof of “common answers” 
because the plaintiffs, all female employees of Wal-Mart, challenged the 
thousands of allegedly discriminatory pay and promotion decisions made 
                                                                                                             
operated under a general policy of discrimination” (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Fal-
con, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982))). 
 18. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (providing that “[a] class action may be maintained if Rule 
23(a) is satisfied and” the proposed class action fits into one of the categories defined 
under Rule 23(b)). 
 19. Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 98–109 (2009) [hereinafter Nagareda, Class Certification]; see also 
Richard A. Nagareda, Common Answers for Class Certification, 63 VAND. L. REV. EN 
BANC 149, 149–55 (2010) [hereinafter Nagareda, Common Answers]. Some scholars have 
not addressed the issue of classwide injury but have implied such a requirement in argu-
ing that the predominance requirement requires a finding that the cases can be substan-
tially “resolved” on a common basis. See, e.g., Allan Erbsen, From “Predominance” to 
“Resolvability”: A New Approach to Regulating Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 
1005–06 (2005); Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 
831–32 (1997). The American Law Institute’s PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE 
LITIGATION has adopted this “resolvability” approach to the predominance requirement, 
and has specifically cited Allan Erbsen’s seminal article for support. AM. L. INST. [ALI], 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.02(a)(1) cmt. a (2010). Other 
scholars have required an assessment of the merits prior to class certification, which 
would entail a finding of classwide injury. See Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class 
Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1253–54 (2002); Geoffrey 
C. Hazard, Jr., Class Certification Based on Merits of the Claims, 69 TENN. L. REV. 1, 3–
6 (2001). 
 20. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note 
19, at 132). 
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by store and regional managers at Wal-Mart’s many stores. The Court 
concluded that “[w]ithout some glue holding the alleged reasons for all 
those decisions together, it will be impossible to say that examination of 
all the class members’ claims for relief will produce a common answer to 
the crucial question why was I disfavored.”21 
This Article argues that the proof of classwide injury requirement aris-
es from three fallacies about the class action. The first fallacy is that class 
actions require a court to resolve all issues in one fell swoop. Thus, proof 
of classwide injury is necessary because, without such proof, the class 
action would unravel into separate trials on the issue of injury.22 But, as 
argued below, the class action does not require an all-at-once determina-
tion of the merits because the class action is not primarily an all-at-once 
trial device but a trust device. The function of the class action is to assign 
dispositive control over the plaintiffs’ claims to a third party, class coun-
sel, for the benefit of the plaintiffs. It does so to allow the class attorney 
to make common investments, which, because of economies of scale, 
lowers the average costs for each plaintiff. The trust function of the class 
action is essential for litigation involving small claims because without it 
no plaintiff would have incentive to bring suit. More importantly, the 
trust function of the class action does not entail an all-at-once determina-
tion of the merits. A class action can incorporate multiple trials of the 
issues as long as the class attorney can make common investments for 
the class. 
The second fallacy is that the class action is an extraordinary remedy 
that, like a preliminary injunction, requires the plaintiffs to show a likeli-
hood of success on the merits.23 In In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian 
Export Antitrust Litigation,24 for example, the court required proof of 
                                                                                                             
 21. Id. at 2552 (emphasis in original). 
 22. See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 187 
(3d Cir. 2001) (concluding that, in the absence of proof of classwide impact, proving 
injury on an individual basis would be a “Herculean task,” which “counsels against find-
ing predominance”); see also Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note 19, at 132 
(“What matters to class certification . . . [is] the capacity of a class-wide proceeding to 
generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.”); Wal-Mart, 131 
S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Nagareda, Common Answers, supra note 19, at 132) (same); Erb-
sen, supra note 19, at 1025 (proposing a “finality principle” for the predominance re-
quirement that provides that “a certified class action seeking damages should eventually 
result in a judgment resolving the claims of all class members”). 
 23. E.g., Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (noting that 
“[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed 
on the merits,” among other things.). 
 24. In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Export Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 
2008). 
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classwide injury in part to test the “novel and complex” theory support-
ing the plaintiffs’ claims.25 Other circuits have required merits determi-
nations to justify granting the “extraordinary leverage” the plaintiffs gain 
from the class action, which can create undue pressure for the defendant 
to settle.26 But permitting a court to preview the merits before certifying 
the class action is at odds with the trust function of the class action. The 
trust function of the class action is designed to equalize the stakes be-
tween the plaintiffs and the defendant because the defendant can auto-
matically exploit economies of scale to invest in common issues.27 Ac-
cordingly, the class action corrects a structural bias the defendants have 
in developing the merits. To avoid this bias, class certification should be 
awarded before any merits determination, not after. 
The third fallacy is that, in the absence of proof of classwide injury, 
individual trials are required to accurately determine each individual 
plaintiff’s injury, and thus prevent uninjured plaintiffs from recovering. 
Setting aside the all-at-once fallacy, this individualist fallacy suggests 
that individual trials are always better than classwide trials to determine 
individual issues. However, and as suggested by the hypothetical above, 
the lack of proof of classwide injury arises mainly from uncertainty as to 
the counterfactual world. Whether a plaintiff has suffered damage de-
pends on how he or she would have fared in the absence of the alleged 
unlawful conduct. As argued below, proving the counterfactual may in-
volve evidence that is common to some or all of the members of the 
class. Moreover, many other areas of the law express no concern for un-
injured plaintiffs recovering. Most importantly, the deterrence function 
of the litigation does not require any improved accuracy that may result 
from individualized hearings. As discussed below, the deterrence func-
tion only requires an assessment of the damage at the class level, not the 
individual level, leaving distributional accuracy a matter of secondary 
importance. 
                                                                                                             
 25. Id. at 26–28 (concluding that a searching inquiry as to classwide impact is neces-
sary since “the granting of class status ‘raises the stakes of litigation so substantially that 
the defendant likely will feel irresistible pressure to settle’” (quoting Waste Mgmt. Hold-
ings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 293 (1st Cir. 2000))). 
 26. Oscar Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 267 
(5th Cir. 2007), overruled by Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 
(2011). 
 27. This is one of the great insights of David Rosenberg’s work on mass tort litiga-
tion. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and 
Plaintiffs Don’t, 37 HARV. J. LEGIS. 393, 395 (2000) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Mass Tort 
Class Actions]; see also Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. 
REV. 1059, 1074–76 (2012) (discussing the problem of asymmetric stakes). 
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After correcting these fallacies, the Article concludes that proof of 
classwide injury should not be required to certify a class. Instead, a class 
action should be certified if, along with the other prerequisites of Rule 
23, the class shares common questions of liability, not common answers 
of injury. Accordingly, the trend of requiring proof of classwide injury, 
most strikingly seen in the Wal-Mart decision and its interpretation of the 
commonality requirement, should reverse course. Otherwise, to insist on 
such barriers to class certification would “impair the deterrent effect of 
the sanctions which underlie much contemporary law.”28 
The Article further argues against adopting the class action as a com-
mon answer in other jurisdictions. As discussed below, clarifying the 
function of the class action in the U.S. context suggests a number of fac-
tors other jurisdictions should consider in importing the class action de-
vice. This is not to say that the class action can only work in the United 
States. Instead, the goal of the Article is to ensure that other jurisdictions 
learn from the United States’ mistakes. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses in more detail the re-
quirement of proof of classwide injury. Part II then discusses each of the 
three fallacies of class actions reflected by the requirement of proof of 
classwide injury: (1) the all-at-once fallacy, (2) the extraordinary remedy 
fallacy, and (3) the individualist fallacy. The Article concludes by argu-
ing that common questions, not common answers, should be the standard 
for class certification, both in the United States and abroad. 
I. PROVING CLASSWIDE INJURY 
Before discussing the requirement of proof of classwide injury, it is 
worth discussing the class action law that applies. Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23 governs federal class actions.29 Rule 23 requires a proposed 
class action to satisfy four prerequisites defined under subsection (a) and 
fit within one of three categories defined under subsection (b).30 The four 
requirements are that “(1) the class is [sufficiently] numerous” (the “nu-
merosity” requirement); “(2) there are questions of law or fact common 
to the class” (the “commonality” requirement); “(3) . . . the representa-
                                                                                                             
 28. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the 
Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 686 (1941). 
 29. FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see also Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437 (2010) (noting that Rule 23 governs all federal class ac-
tions). 
 30. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), (b); see also Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437 (“‘[a] class 
action may be maintained’ if two conditions are met: the suit must satisfy the criteria set 
forth in subdivision (a) . . . and it also must fit into one of the three categories described 
in subdivision (b).” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)). 
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tive parties are typical” (the “typicality” requirement); and “(4) the repre-
sentative parties will fairly and adequately protect” the class (the “ade-
quacy of representation” requirement).31 
Rule 23(b)(3) defines a residual category of class actions which applies 
generally to litigation involving monetary remedies.32 Rule 23(b)(3) 
permits a class action only if common questions “predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members” (the “predominance” re-
quirement) and the “class action is superior to other available methods” 
(the “superiority” requirement).33 
Proving classwide injury primarily implicates the predominance re-
quirement of Rule 23(b)(3). Courts have concluded that a failure to show 
that every class member was injured would necessarily result in individ-
ualized determinations of injury, and such “individual issues . . . would . 
. . overwhelm[] the common ones.”34 
In New Motor Vehicles, for example, the plaintiffs alleged that an un-
lawful horizontal conspiracy among car manufacturers restricted the flow 
of Canadian cars into the U.S. market.35 The restriction allegedly raised 
the negotiating range—the lower “dealer invoice price” and the higher 
“Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Price (“MSRP”)”—for new U.S. 
cars.36 The plaintiffs’ experts relied on what the First Circuit considered 
a “novel and complex theory” to show an increase in the negotiating 
range caused by the alleged conspiracy.37 
The district court certified a class of indirect purchasers harmed by the 
alleged conspiracy under various state antitrust laws, but the First Circuit 
vacated the certification order. Among other things, First Circuit ex-
pressed skepticism that the plaintiffs could prove that all members of the 
class paid higher prices, because the class contained both “hard bargain-
                                                                                                             
 31. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(4). 
 32. See Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 39 
F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966) (discussing creation of Rule 23(b)(3) category); Benjamin Kaplan, 
A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969) (noting that the then-
newly created Rule 23(b)(3) category for damage class actions is the “most adventure-
some of the new types”). 
 33. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 34. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988). 
 35. In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Export Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 
2008). 
 36. Id. at 10. The reason for this range is that, until recently, federal antitrust law 
considered vertical price-fixing per se unlawful. Leegin Creative Leather Products v. 
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007) (holding that vertical price-fixing is only subject to 
rule of reason review). 
 37. See New Motor Vehicles, 522 F.3d at 26. 
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ers” and “poor negotiators.”38 The court noted that some of the poor ne-
gotiators may have avoided an injury because they paid the same or less 
in the actual world, as compared to world that would have existed but for 
the alleged antitrust violation (the “but-for” world).39 Given this variance 
among the class members, the First Circuit concluded that issues of law 
or fact common to the class did not “predominate.”40 
The lack of predominance in New Motor Vehicles was caused, in part, 
by the variation among the class members. But the actual variation 
among the class members was not the primary cause of the difficulty in 
proving classwide injury. After all, if the plaintiffs could determine who 
the poor negotiators were who suffered no injury, they would have ex-
cluded them from the class. Instead, the primary cause is the potential 
variation of the plaintiffs, which arises from uncertainty as to who should 
be excluded. The plaintiffs in New Motor Vehicles had yet to propose a 
method of determining who the poor negotiators who suffered no injury 
were,41 or at least had not proven that there were no such poor negotia-
tors.42 
The uncertainty as to whether each plaintiff was injured is itself caused 
by the uncertainty of the plaintiffs’ positions in the but-for, or counter-
factual, world. In New Motor Vehicles a potential plaintiff could negoti-
ate over the price, and thus could choose to accept the higher, MSRP 
price, bargain to the dealers’ invoice price, or bargain somewhere in be-
tween. The poor negotiators may have been stuck paying the MSRP in 
both worlds, suffering no loss. However, because no one can know what 
would have happened in the but-for world, no one can determine if any 
poor negotiator would have paid the MSRP in the absence of the alleged 
anticompetitive conduct. 
The ability to negotiate, while sufficient, is not necessary to create the 
uncertainty in the counterfactual world that prevents common proof of 
injury. In McLaughlin v. American Tobacco Co.,43 for example, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendant tobacco companies engaged in a 
scheme to fraudulently market “light” cigarettes as healthier, despite 
their knowledge that light cigarettes can expose the smoker to the same 
                                                                                                             
 38. Id. at 29. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 29–30. 
 41. Id. at 28 (noting that plaintiffs’ expert had not devised a model for determining 
injury and damages). 
 42. Id. at 29 (providing no proof that “the entire negotiating range” was greater in the 
actual world as compared to the but-for world). 
 43. 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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amount of nicotine through compensation.44 The facts concerning the 
defendant’s marketing scheme and knowledge were largely undisputed.45 
The district court certified a class of light cigarette purchasers harmed by 
the scheme, with potential damages running “billions of dollars.”46 The 
district court recognized that the plaintiffs’ civil RICO claims required 
proof of reliance on the fraud, which may raise individual issues, but 
concluded that the plaintiffs’ proffered methodologies for determining 
reliance were sufficient.47 
The Second Circuit disagreed. It noted that the civil RICO statute,48 
which served as the basis for the plaintiffs’ claims, required a showing of 
“transaction or ‘but-for’ causation.”49 Accordingly, the Second Circuit 
concluded that the proposed class had to show that each plaintiff “relied 
on the defendant’s misrepresentation.”50 However, the Second Circuit 
concluded that transaction causation could not be proven on a classwide 
basis, because 
[i]ndividualized proof is needed to overcome the possibility that a 
member of the purported class purchased Lights for some reason other 
than the belief that Lights were a healthier alternative—for example, if 
a Lights smoker was unaware of that representation, preferred the taste 
of Lights, or chose Lights as an expression of personal style.51 
The Second Circuit cited a recent Ninth Circuit case, Poulos v. Cae-
sars World, Inc.,52 involving alleged fraudulent representations made 
                                                                                                             
 44. Id. at 220. 
 45. In related litigation, a district court found “overwhelming evidence” that the de-
fendants’ intentionally used deceptive brand descriptors to market light cigarettes. See 
United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 27 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 46. Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1018 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(Weinstein, J.), overruled by McLaughlin, 522 F.3d 215. 
 47. Id. at 1044–46. 
 48. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act provides, 
among other things, that “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a 
violation of [RICO’s substantive provisions] may sue . . . and shall recover threefold the 
damages he sustains.” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006). The Second Circuit noted that the “by 
reason of” language in the statute requires a showing “that the defendant’s violation not 
only was a ‘but for’ cause of his injury, but was the proximate cause as well.” McLaugh-
lin, 522 F.3d at 222 (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 
(1992)). Since then, the Supreme Court has held that proof of reliance by the plaintiffs is 
not necessary. See Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 645–59 (2008) 
(holding that plaintiffs are not required to prove reliance to assert a civil RICO claim, but 
still requiring a showing of proximate cause). 
 49. McLaughlin, 522 F.3d at 222. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 223. 
 52. 379 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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concerning video poker and electronic slot machines.53 There, the Ninth 
Circuit found no predominance because the plaintiffs could not prove 
reliance on a common basis. The Ninth Circuit noted that “[g]amblers do 
not share a common universe of knowledge and expectations—one moti-
vation does not ‘fit all.’”54 
Unlike in New Motor Vehicles, the plaintiffs in both McLaughlin and 
Poulos did not negotiate over prices. Nevertheless, the same counterfac-
tual uncertainty arose in both contexts because of the discretion the pur-
chasers could exercise in whether to purchase at all. As noted in 
McLaughlin, a cigarette purchaser may purchase light cigarettes for life-
style reasons—she enjoys the flavor or thinks that “smoking Lights [is] 
‘cool.’”55 Such “lifestyle” purchasers would not have suffered injury be-
cause they would have purchased light cigarettes even in the absence of 
the fraud. Likewise, video poker players would not be injured if they 
would have gambled in the absence of the fraudulent representations. 
Because the plaintiffs in both cases could not ascertain the true motiva-
tion for all counterfactual purchase decisions, they could not prove that 
all purchasers in the class were in fact injured. 
The above three cases suggest that the difficulty in proving classwide 
injury arises mainly from the discretion a plaintiff can exercise. In New 
Motor Vehicles, the plaintiffs could exercise discretion in negotiating 
prices and thus avoid (or not avoid) injury. Likewise, in McLaughlin, the 
plaintiffs could exercise discretion and also avoid (or not avoid) injury in 
choosing to purchase the cigarettes at all. 56 
But consider, by way of contrast, Klay v. Humana, Inc.,57 in which the 
plaintiffs, all doctors, alleged civil RICO claims that major health 
maintenance organizations (“HMOs”) “conspired with each other to pro-
gram their computer systems to systematically underpay physicians for 
their services,” and fraudulently misrepresented their reimbursement 
practices to the plaintiffs.58 The HMOs argued that the doctors could not 
satisfy predominance because, as in McLaughlin, “each individual plain-
                                                                                                             
 53. Id. at 659–60; McLaughlin, 522 F.3d at 225 (discussing Poulos). 
 54. Poulos, 379 F.3d at 665. 
 55. McLaughlin, 522 F.3d at 225. 
 56. Indeed, the discretion that a party can exercise to avoid an injury, such as by pur-
chasing or not purchasing a product, is an off-shoot of the Coase Theorem, which posits 
that in the absence of transaction costs, parties can bargain to the most efficient allocation 
of legal entitlements. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2–
15 (1960) (setting forth the Coase theorem). 
 57. 382 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 58. Id. at 1246. 
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tiff must specifically show that he, personally, relied on the misstate-
ments at issue.”59 
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. After emphasizing that the existence 
of an alleged unlawful conspiracy was itself common to the class, it not-
ed that, while the defendants used a variety of communications to de-
fraud the physicians, “they all conveyed essentially the same message—
that the defendants would honestly pay physicians the amounts to which 
they were entitled.”60 The court explained, 
[i]t does not strain credulity to conclude that each plaintiff, in entering 
into contracts with the defendants, relied upon the defendants’ repre-
sentations and assumed they would be paid the amounts they were due. 
A jury could quite reasonably infer that guarantees concerning physi-
cian pay—the very consideration upon which those agreements are 
based—go to the heart of these agreements, and that doctors based their 
assent upon them.61 
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that each plaintiff’s reliance 
could be proven through common evidence, in this case “through legiti-
mate inferences based on the nature of the alleged misrepresentations at 
issue.”62 
Klay contains the same discretionary conduct found in cases such as 
New Motor Vehicles and McLaughlin. The doctors in Klay exercised dis-
cretion in entering contracts with HMOs over reimbursement practices, 
similar to the exercise of discretion in negotiating the price of a car or 
buying a light cigarette. But the same difficulty in proving classwide in-
jury does not arise because the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the dis-
cretionary conduct in Klay did not lead to counterfactual uncertainty as 
to the fact of injury. In both New Motor Vehicles and McLaughlin, the 
ability to exercise discretion created uncertainty as to the counterfactual 
baseline. Would a poor negotiator have done any better without the al-
leged antitrust violation? Would a plaintiff have bought a light cigarette 
anyway for “lifestyle” reasons?  
By contrast, the Klay court concluded that the plaintiffs’ discretion did 
not create similar counterfactual uncertainty. Unlike in McLaughlin, it 
was difficult for the Klay court to imagine a counterfactual where the 
doctors would have assented to the exact same contract terms with full 
                                                                                                             
 59. Id. at 1258. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1259. 
 62. Id. 
764 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 37:3 
knowledge of the defendants’ real reimbursement practices.63 The ana-
logue in New Motor Vehicles would be proof that the entire negotiating 
range increased, leaving no doubt that everyone was injured.64 
As shown by Klay, the availability of discretion only causes counter-
factual uncertainty if it creates an uncertain link in the causal chain that 
leads to counterfactual uncertainty as a whole. Indeed, the state of mind 
of a party is notoriously a black box in the absence of overt manifesta-
tions of it. Consequently, the difficulty of proving classwide injury ex-
tends to situations where there are similar uncertain links in the causal 
chain that lead to counterfactual uncertainty. 
For example, in consumer fraud litigation involving the seizure drug 
Neurontin, the plaintiffs alleged a widespread scheme to fraudulently 
induce doctors to prescribe Neurontin to their patients for off-label use as 
a general pain reliever, even though Neurontin had no efficacy in treating 
pain.65 The plaintiffs showed that, since the start of the alleged fraudulent 
marketing scheme, the number of prescriptions of Neurontin for pain 
relief and similar off-label indications skyrocketed.66 
The district court, however, found no predominance of common issues 
because, among other things, the court found that the plaintiffs could not 
prove classwide injury.67 The court noted that the plaintiffs’ proposed 
econometric models for classwide injury could not “identify which pre-
scribing physicians were exposed to defendants’ fraudulent statements.” 
Thus, the court could not “determine which consumer class members’ 
Neurontin prescriptions were caused by defendants’ alleged fraud,” as 
opposed to those prescriptions “which would have occurred even in the 
absence of the fraud.”68 As the district court correctly pointed out, only 
the class members whose prescriptions were caused by the fraud “had a 
cognizable injury.”69 
                                                                                                             
 63. As an aside, the contrast presented here is not meant to endorse the Klay court’s 
conclusion that it was reasonable to infer that every doctor relied upon the HMO’s con-
tract provisions. In fact, it is troubling that the Klay court would give the benefit of the 
doubt to doctors in inferring classwide injury but other courts would not do so for less 
sympathetic (and probably lower-income) smokers and gamblers. 
 64. See, e.g., Natchitoches Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. v. Tyco Int’l, Ltd., 262 F.R.D. 58, 
69 (D. Mass. 2009) (finding predominance satisfied since plaintiffs showed that the “‘en-
tire negotiating range’ . . . was higher than the prices in the but-for world”). 
 65. See In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Pracs. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 89, 91 (D. Mass. 
2007). 
 66. Id. at 96–103 (providing charts and data demonstrating such changes). 
 67. Id. at 110–12. 
 68. Id. at 111–12 (emphasis in original). 
 69. Id. 
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In Neurontin the uncertain link in the causal chain was not the discre-
tion of the plaintiffs, but the discretion of a third party—a doctor—to 
prescribe the drug. Indeed, as suggested in the Wal-Mart case, it can also 
arise from the discretion of the defendant. Would the defendant (or, as in 
Wal-Mart, one of its subordinates) have discriminated against the plain-
tiff is she were male?70 
Similar uncertain links in the causal chain arose in products liability 
litigation involving the drug Vioxx.71 There, the plaintiffs provided epi-
demiological evidence demonstrating that Vioxx increased the risk of 
heart attacks and strokes. Nevertheless, the district court denied class 
certification. The district court recognized that “the majority of plaintiffs 
in this case allegedly suffered a heart attack or stroke as a result of in-
gesting Vioxx.”72 However, as in Neurontin, the court noted that individ-
ual issues predominated as to, among other issues, “whether the plain-
tiffs’ physicians would still have prescribed Vioxx had stronger warnings 
been given.”73 Moreover, the court concluded that it would have to en-
gage in “the highly individualized inquiry of whether Vioxx specifically 
caused the injury alleged by each plaintiff in light of his or her medical 
history, family history, and other risk factors, and the use of the drug.”74 
In Vioxx, the counterfactual uncertainty did not arise exclusively from 
the discretion of the plaintiffs or third parties, but from biological uncer-
tainties in the causal chain. It is unclear whether, given individual “risk 
factors,” a particular plaintiff would have suffered a heart attack or stroke 
in the counterfactual world of not taking Vioxx. Indeed, because issues 
of specific causation always arise in cases involving pharmaceuticals, the 
court noted that “courts have almost invariably found that common ques-
tions of fact do not predominate in pharmaceutical drug cases.”75 
II. THREE CLASS ACTION FALLACIES 
The previous Part discussed the difficulty of proving classwide injury 
in different substantive areas of the law. It showed that the difficulty in 
proving classwide injury arises from links in the causal chain that lead to 
uncertainty as to what would have happened had the alleged legal viola-
                                                                                                             
 70. Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011); see also D. James 
Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights Cases, 122 HARV. L. REV. 533, 559–65 (2008) 
(noting that the central causation issue in employment discrimination cases is whether the 
decision would have been different if the gender or race was different). 
 71. In re Vioxx Products Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 452 (E.D. La. 2006). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 461. 
 74. Id. at 462. 
 75. Id. at 461. 
766 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 37:3 
tion not occurred. It is this counterfactual uncertainty that prevents plain-
tiffs from showing that every plaintiff in the class was injured because of 
the defendant’s alleged unlawful conduct. 
This Part discusses the premises that underlie the requirement of proof 
of classwide injury. It argues that the requirement arises from three falla-
cies about the class action: (A) the all-at-once fallacy, (B) the extraordi-
nary remedy fallacy, and (C) the individualist fallacy. 
A. The All-at-Once Fallacy 
As noted above, the primary source of the requirement of proof of 
classwide injury is the predominance requirement, which requires that 
“questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over 
any questions affecting only individual members.”76 The concern is that 
in the absence of proof of classwide injury, individual issues of injury 
would “overwhelm” any common issues.77 As put by the Third Circuit in 
a securities fraud case involving allegedly fraudulent representations that 
brokers made trades at the “best reasonably available price”: 
Whether a class member suffered economic loss from a given securities 
transaction would require proof of the circumstances surrounding each 
trade, the available alternative prices, and the state of mind of each in-
vestor at the time the trade was requested.78 
The Third Circuit concluded that “[t]his Herculean task, involving hun-
dreds of millions of transactions, counsels against finding predomi-
nance.”79 
It is easy to miss the premise of the seemingly common-sense observa-
tion that, in the absence of common proof of injury, the court will face 
the “Herculean” task of determining injury on an individual basis. The 
premise is that the class action requires an all-at-once assessment of the 
issues. As put by the late Richard Nagareda, “class certification does not 
turn upon the mere raising of common questions by way of expert sub-
missions or any form of evidence. Class certification instead turns on the 
capacity of a unitary proceeding to yield common answers.”80 
                                                                                                             
 76. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 77. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988). 
 78. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 187 (3d 
Cir. 2001). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Nagareda, Common Answers, supra note 19, at 154 (emphasis added); see also 
Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (quoting Nagareda, Class Certi-
fication, supra note 19, at 132) (same). 
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Consider, for example, General Telephone Company of the Southwest 
v. Falcon,81 a case involving a Mexican-American plaintiff who was al-
legedly denied a promotion on the basis of his race.82 In Falcon, the 
plaintiff sought to certify a class of all Mexican-Americans injured by 
any of the defendant’s allegedly discriminatory employment practices, 
even though the plaintiff himself was only affected by the defendant’s 
promotion practices. Nevertheless, the plaintiff was permitted to certify a 
class due to the across-the-board rule then followed by the Fifth Circuit, 
which permitted an alleged victim of racial discrimination to bring suit 
on behalf of all similarly situated victims. The Fifth Circuit premised the 
across-the-board rule on the fact that “racial discrimination is by defini-
tion class discrimination.”83 As the case proceeded, the only class claim 
that survived was a disparate impact claim concerning the defendant’s 
hiring practices, which had little do to with the plaintiff’s own case of 
disparate treatment in his promotion.84 
The Supreme Court vacated class certification largely because the 
plaintiff failed to satisfy the “typicality” and “commonality” require-
ments.85 The Court noted that 
[c]lass relief is “peculiarly appropriate” when the “issues involved are 
common to the class as a whole” and when they “turn on questions of 
law applicable in the same manner to each member of the class.” For in 
such cases, “the class-action device saves the resources of both the 
courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting every 
[class member] to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule 
23.”86 
But the Court concluded that the complaint “provided an insufficient ba-
sis for concluding that the adjudication of his claim of discrimination in 
promotion would require the decision of any common question concern-
ing the failure of petitioner to hire more Mexican-Americans.”87 
The premise of Falcon, that the function of the class action is to deter-
mine all issues “in an economical fashion under Rule 23,” is pervasive.88 
                                                                                                             
 81. 457 U.S. 147 (1982). 
 82. Id. at 149. 
 83. Id. at 157 (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s “across-the-board rule”). 
 84. Id. at 152. 
 85. Id. at 158. The Court noted in passing that “[t]he commonality and typicality 
requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge,” which also “tend to merge with the adequacy-
of-representation requirement.” Id. at 157 n.13. 
 86. Id. at 155 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 
442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979)). 
 87. Id. at 158. 
 88. Califano, 442 U.S. at 701. 
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Consider Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, which the Court decided this 
past term.89 In Wal-Mart, the plaintiffs alleged a disparate treatment 
claim against Wal-Mart that did not center on any one specific pay or 
promotion policy, but the lack of one.90 Specifically, the plaintiffs al-
leged that the defendant’s lack of criteria for such decisions, coupled 
with a uniform corporate culture, led to excessive subjectivity that 
caused discriminatory pay and promotion decisions by regional and store 
managers against over a million of Wal-Mart’s female employees.91  
The plaintiffs emphasized that the core issue of whether the policy of 
excessive subjectivity supports an inference of discriminatory intent is 
common to the class.92 The Court, however, noted that the commonality 
of discriminatory intent was beside the point, since, quoting Nagareda, 
[w]hat matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of common 
“questions”—even in droves—but, rather the capacity of a classwide 
proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of 
the litigation. Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have 
the potential to impede the generation of common answers.93 
The Court concluded that the plaintiffs sought “to sue about literally mil-
lions of employment decisions at once.”94 But, according to the Court, 
“[w]ithout some glue holding the alleged reasons for all those decisions 
together, it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class 
members’ claims for relief will produce a common answer to the crucial 
question why was I disfavored.”95 
The plaintiffs in both Falcon and Wal-Mart sought to certify a class 
under Rule 23(b)(2), which does not require a finding of predominance.96 
Both cases turned on the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2),97 
                                                                                                             
 89. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 90. Id. at 2547–48. 
 91. Id. at 2548. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note 19, 
at 132). 
 94. Id. at 2552 (emphasis added). 
 95. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 96. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (providing that a class action may be certified if, 
along with satisfying the requirements of Rule 23(a), the plaintiff shows that “the party 
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, 
so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting 
the class as a whole”). 
 97. Falcon also concerned the “typicality” requirement of Rule 23(a)(3), but noted 
that “[t]he commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge.” Gen. 
Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982). 
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and as the Court has recognized in other contexts, the “predominance 
criterion is [a] far more demanding” requirement than commonality.98 
Nevertheless, the Court’s insistence on “common answers” has as its 
source the predominance requirement. This is particularly true in Wal-
Mart, where the very text quoted by the Court is a criticism by Nagareda 
of the predominance requirement’s focus on common questions. In Na-
gareda’s view, the predominance requirement should focus on “dissimi-
larities,” not “similarities,” since “[h]eaps of similarities do not over-
come dissimilarities that would prevent common resolution.”99 Other 
scholars, most notably Allan Erbsen, have similarly stressed the im-
portance of “[s]imilarity among claims” since it “facilitates crafting a 
judgment that specifies the rights of all class members.”100 In contrast, 
according to Erbsen, “dissimilarity may necessitate fact-intensive case-
by-case inquiries into the propriety of judgment that would make class 
litigation difficult, if not impossible.”101 Erbsen has gone so far as to 
suggest that “it is time to excise ‘predominance’ from the vernacular of 
class action discourse and replace it with a more practical ‘resolvability’ 
approach.”102 
The class action, however, does not require “a classwide proceeding to 
generate common answers”103 so that “a judgment . . . specifies the rights 
of all class members.”104 In fact, if that were the case, then no antitrust, 
securities fraud, or employment discrimination class action would ever 
be certified. This is because individual issues of damages are always pre-
sent in cases involving damage remedies, and thus always require the 
very case-by-case inquiries that, as suggested by Falcon and Wal-Mart, 
would preclude class certification. Nevertheless, there is a consensus that 
“individual damage questions do not preclude a Rule 23(b)(3) class ac-
tion when the issue of liability is common to the class.”105 
                                                                                                             
 98. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623–24 (1997). 
 99. Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note 19, at 132; see also Wal-Mart, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2556 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that “Profes-
sor Nagareda, whose ‘dissimilarities’ inquiry the Court endorses, developed his position 
in the context of Rule 23(b)(3)”). 
 100. Erbsen, supra note 19, at 1027. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 1088. 
 103. Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (quoting Nagareda, 
Class Certification, supra note 19, at 132). 
 104. Erbsen, supra note 19, at 1027. 
 105. 6 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON 
CLASS ACTIONS § 24:124 (4th ed. 2002) (quoted by McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 
522 F.3d 215, 231 (2d Cir. 2008)) [hereinafter NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS]; see also In 
re New Motor Vehicles Can. Export Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 28 (1st Cir. 2008) 
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Courts typically address the problem of individual damage issues by, 
in essence, denying that the class action requires a “classwide proceeding 
to generate common answers” to all issues.106 One common solution is 
bifurcation, or dividing the class action into a single trial on common 
issues of liability, followed by individual trials on damages. This ap-
proach, in fact, was commonly used in employment discrimination cases 
prior to Wal-Mart,107 and is currently used in antitrust108 and civil RICO 
cases.109 
Another approach, typically taken in the securities fraud and antitrust 
contexts, is to paper over individual issues by viewing the determination 
of damages as “a mechanical task involving the administration of a for-
mula.”110 The use of such formulas to determine damages may result in 
an inaccurate assessment of individual damages, but courts have not re-
quired precision “where such a formula may be used to eliminate the 
                                                                                                             
(“Predominance is not defeated by individual damages questions as long as liability is 
still subject to common proof.”); Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 
(1997) (“Predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging consumer or securi-
ties fraud or violations of the antitrust laws.”). 
 106. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note 
19, at 132). 
 107. See, e.g., Robinson v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 168–69 (2d 
Cir. 2001) (holding that district court abused its discretion in “denying partial certifica-
tion” of a class as to liability only, with individual issues of damages determined sepa-
rately); see also 8 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 105, § 24:124 (“The majority 
of courts have held the bifurcation of class liability and relief phases of Title VII suits to 
be an appropriate means of litigating employment discrimination claims.”). In fact, Rule 
23 permits certification as to common issues. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) (“When appro-
priate, an action may be maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.”). 
However, Wal-Mart puts the use of bifurcation in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions in serious 
doubt. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558–59 (rejecting such bifurcation). 
 108. See, e.g., New Motor Vehicles, 522 F.3d at 28 (noting that “the class action can be 
limited to the question of liability, leaving damages for later individualized determina-
tions”); In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(Sotomayor, J.), overruled on other grounds by In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 
471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006) (“In the event that the district court does find conflicts [as to 
damage calculation] . . . there are a variety of devices available to resolve the problem 
[including] . . . the possibilities of bifurcating liability and damage trials.”). 
 109. See, e.g., Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(Posner, J.) (citing Visa Check, 280 F.3d at 141) (affirming RICO class certification and 
suggesting procedural mechanisms available at a later stage for individual issues such as 
damages and bifurcation). 
 110. 7 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 105, § 22:65; see also Blackie v. Bar-
rack, 524 F.2d 891, 905 (9th Cir. 1975) (“[S]hould the class prevail the amount of price 
inflation during the period can be charted and the process of computing individual dam-
ages will be virtually a mechanical task.”). 
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need for individual proof of damages and thus serve the ends of both jus-
tice and judicial economy.”111 
But why can a court permit bifurcation or imprecision for the amount 
of damages, but-for not the fact of damages? After all, one could, in the-
ory,112 define an inchoate class of individuals and determine both the fact 
and amount of damages during an individual issue phase. One reason 
why courts distinguish between the fact of damage and the amount of 
damages arises out of Article III concerns.113 Although the Supreme 
Court has not addressed the issue, it has recognized that a class member 
who cannot show injury-in-fact may lack Article III standing to sue.114 
                                                                                                             
 111. 6 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 105, § 18:53 (noting that “the court 
should not reject” class actions in the antitrust context due to inaccurate methods of as-
sessing and distributing damages). 
 112. I say “in theory” because, along with proof of classwide injury, courts also re-
quire plaintiffs to identify all class members, and cite “the bedrock principle that mem-
bers of a class must be identifiable.” In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Pracs. Litig., 244 
F.R.D. 89, 113 (D. Mass. 2007); see also Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contempo-
rary Judicial Hostility to Small-Claims Consumer Class Actions, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 
309 (2010) (criticizing the requirement of “ascertainability” in small claims class ac-
tions). I criticize this ascertainability requirement below. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 113. Another reason for the insistence on classwide proof of injury arises out of due 
process concerns. For example, the Second Circuit in McLaughlin, quoting Newton, not-
ed that since “‘actual injury cannot be presumed, . . . defendants have the right to raise 
individual defenses against each class member.’” McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 
F.3d 215, 232 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 191–92 (3d Cir. 2001)) (rejecting use of fluid recovery procedures for 
determining and distributing damages). Similarly, in Wal-Mart, the Court rejected the use 
of sampling to determine damages, concluding that such a “Trial by Formula” is inappro-
priate because “Wal-Mart will not be entitled to litigate its statutory defenses to individu-
al claims.” Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011). Thus, if plaintiffs 
cannot establish the fact of injury on a common basis, courts conclude that the individual 
rights of the parties, particularly the defendants, must be protected. I discuss these due 
process concerns in more detail in a separate article. See Campos, supra note 27, at 1088–
1121 (discussing and criticizing due process for procedural rights such as individual de-
fenses). Nevertheless, it should be noted that while the use of imprecise procedures for 
assessing damages may undermine a defendant’s individual defenses, bifurcation keeps 
intact a defendant’s right to assert individual’s defenses. 
 114. See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612 (1997) (acknowledg-
ing, but not deciding, issue of whether exposure-only claimants have standing to sue); 
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 831 (1999) (same); see also Diane Wood 
Hutchinson, Class Actions: Joinder or Representational Device?, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 
459, 503–04 (discussing standing and mootness issues). The Court recently denied certio-
rari over the issue of standing in class actions. See Stearns v. Ticketmaster Corp., 655 
F.3d 1013, 1013 (9th Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1970 (U.S. 2012) (holding that 
proof of classwide injury is not necessary for the class to have standing for Article III 
purposes). 
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This standing issue is of particular relevance because it strikes at the 
core of the function of the class action. Requiring each class member to 
demonstrate an injury-in-fact suggests that the class action is a “joinder” 
device in which the class action merely aggregates disparate plaintiffs 
together in one suit.115 In fact, Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority 
opinion in Wal-Mart, has suggested that the class action is a joinder de-
vice in other settings.116 If so, then the class action would require proof 
of classwide injury to get off the ground for Article III purposes. 
One could also view the class action as a “representation” device, in 
which the only party for purposes of the litigation is the class representa-
tive.117 Understood in this way, each of the absent class members would 
not have to independently establish standing so long as the representative 
did so. In fact, as Judge Diane Wood has argued previously, the existing 
case law supports the “representational” view over the “joinder” view, 
and the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate 
Litigation (of which Richard Nagareda was a reporter) has explicitly en-
dorsed the “representational” view.118 
However, the class action is neither a “joinder” device nor a “represen-
tational” device. Instead, the class action is a trust device, which be-
comes apparent once one examines why class actions are preferable in 
small claims litigation like the antitrust, securities fraud, civil RICO, and 
employment discrimination cases discussed thus far.119 The Supreme 
Court noted in Amchem Products v. Windsor,120 a mass tort case, that: 
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to over-
come the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for 
any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A 
class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry po-
                                                                                                             
 115. See Hutchinson, supra note 114, at 459–60 (discussing class actions as a “join-
der” device). 
 116. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 
1431, 1443 (2010) (Scalia, J.) (describing Rule 23 as only “allowing multiple claims (and 
claims by or against multiple parties) to be litigated together.”). 
 117. Hutchinson, supra note 114, at 503–06 (discussing historical vacillation between 
viewing class actions as “joinder” and as “representational” devices, but arguing in favor 
of the “representational” view). 
 118. See ALI, supra note 19, § 1.01 cmt. c. 
 119. In what follows I summarize the argument that the class action is a de facto 
“trust” device. For a more extended argument in favor of the trust function of the class 
action, see Campos, supra note 27, at 9. I also discuss the class action trust function and 
the issue of Article III standing in much more detail in a separate article. See Sergio J. 
Campos, The Trust Function of the Class Action (June 20, 2012) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author). 
 120. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
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tential recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an attor-
ney’s) labor.121 
This rationale for the class action for small claims litigation has been 
invoked repeatedly by the Court122 and by scholars.123 
It is worth unpacking this rationale. In small claims litigation an indi-
vidual plaintiff lacks an “incentive . . . to bring a solo action prosecuting 
his or her rights” because the stakes are too small.124 It would be irration-
al for a plaintiff to spend his or her own money, or secure financing, 
when the investment would cost more than the expected return. Put more 
bluntly by Judge Posner, “only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”125 
The class action solves this problem of insufficient individual incentive 
to sue by “aggregat[ing] the paltry potential recoveries” of the plain-
tiffs.126 The class action collects together the expected recoveries of the 
plaintiffs so that the costs of bringing an action, as well as other common 
investments, are spread among the plaintiffs. In doing so, the class action 
lowers the average per-plaintiff costs of common investments by increas-
ing the scale of the expected recovery. Put another way, the class action 
exploits economies of scale to give the plaintiffs incentives both to bring 
and to invest in the litigation.127 
                                                                                                             
 121. Id. at 617 (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 
1997)). 
 122. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812–13 (1985) (noting 
that “[r]equiring a plaintiff to affirmatively request inclusion would probably impede the 
prosecution of those class actions involving an aggregation of small individual claims, 
where a large number of claims are required to make it economical to bring suit”); De-
posit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“Where it is not economical-
ly feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small in-
dividual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress un-
less they may employ the class-action device.”). 
 123. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. 
L. REV. 2043, 2046 (2010); Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class 
Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. 
REV. 103, 105–06 (2006); William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?: A Positive 
Externalities Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC. L. REV. 709, 710 
(2006). 
 124. Mace, 109 F.3d at 344; Campos, supra note 27, at 1079 & n.79 (quoting Mace). 
 125. Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) 
(discussing a civil RICO small claims class action). 
 126. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617 (quoting Mace, 109 F.3d at 344). 
 127. The source of this insight is David Rosenberg in his work on mass tort litigation. 
See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A ‘Public Law’ 
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 902–03 (1984). Recent work by Rosen-
berg clarifying the problem and how a mandatory class action resolves it include David 
Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions: Cost Without Bene-
fit, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19; David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The 
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But it is important to be precise about how the class action creates in-
centives to invest in the suit through economies of scale. As the Amchem 
Court noted, the aggregation of expected recoveries makes the individual 
actions “something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.”128 
The “usually an attorney’s” caveat is crucial. The class action is worth an 
attorney’s labor, in part because class attorneys are typically assigned a 
percentage of the plaintiffs’ aggregate recovery.129 Moreover, under the 
common fund doctrine, any investment costs are spread among the class 
members, even those plaintiffs who do not collect.130 Accordingly, the 
expected return of the class attorney is a function of the plaintiffs’ aggre-
gate net expected recovery. In other words, the class attorney is given a 
beneficial interest in the recovery that is consistent with owning the total 
net expected recovery of the plaintiffs.131 
In addition to an interest in the plaintiffs’ net expected recovery, class 
attorneys are given control over the plaintiffs’ claims. This control is ex-
emplified by one of the most controversial aspects of the class action—
the ability of class attorneys to settle the claims of all plaintiffs without 
their consent. A settlement requires a judicial hearing on its fairness and 
permits individual class members to raise objections to the settlement, 
but does not require the consent of the class.132 
Many scholars have criticized this aspect of the class action as a taking 
of the plaintiffs’ property without their consent.133 Others have suggested 
                                                                                                             
Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831 (2002); Rosenberg, Mass Tort 
Class Actions, supra note 27; David Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings in Mass 
Tort Cases: Lessons from a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REV. 695 (1989); David Rosen-
berg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 
IND. L.J. 561 (1987); see also Campos, supra note 27, at 1064 n.19, 1076–79 (discussing 
Rosenberg and the function of the class action in allowing the plaintiffs to exploit econ-
omies of scale). 
 128. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617 (quoting Mace, 109 F.3d at 344). 
 129. ALI, supra note 19, § 3.13(a) cmt. b (noting that “most courts and commentators 
now believe that the percentage [of the fee] method is superior” to the “lodestar meth-
od”). 
 130. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980) (permitting a district court 
to apportion costs, including attorneys’ fees, against the unclaimed portion of a class 
action judgment under the “common-fund doctrine”). 
 131. Campos, supra note 27, at 1077–78. 
 132. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (permitting a class action to be settled subject to a fair-
ness hearing). 
 133. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 
AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 149–51 (2009); John Bronsteen, Class 
Action Settlements: An Opt-In Proposal, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 903, 904–07; John 
Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1419–22 
(2003). 
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mechanisms by which the plaintiffs can still exercise their control (or 
autonomy) over their claims in a class action, such as by opting out of 
the class134 or through voting mechanisms.135 
But the “taking” caused by the class action can be understood as the 
transfer of an entitlement to exercise dispositive control over the claims 
for the benefit of the class. Thus, this transfer is functionally an assign-
ment of “title” over the claims, which is analogous to the title that trus-
tees own over trust assets for the benefit of the beneficiaries.136 
More importantly, this assignment of title to the class attorney should 
not be considered per se137 problematic because the assignment is neces-
sary to make the litigation worth an attorney’s “labor.” Although the 
class attorney has a percentage interest in the plaintiffs’ net expected re-
covery, the attorney will not have a reason to invest in common issues 
unless she has dispositive control over the claims, including the power to 
sell the claims through settlement. Otherwise, any investments can be 
thwarted by the independent actions of the plaintiffs, who can bring suit 
separately and deny any share of the recovery to the class attorney.138 If 
the class attorney has nothing, he or she has nothing to lose (or win, for 
that matter).139 
                                                                                                             
 134. ALI, supra note 19, § 2.07 cmt. e. 
 135. See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 913, 921–22 (1998); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: 
Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
370, 376–77 (2000). 
 136. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003) (defining a “trust” as a “fiduciary 
relationship” which “subject[s] the person who holds title to the property to duties to deal 
with it for the benefit of . . . one or more persons, at least one of whom is not the sole 
trustee.”); Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. APCC Services, Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 278–
80 (2008) (defining, and distinguishing, the “beneficial interest” in a claim from the “le-
gal title” to the claim, and noting that those with only a “legal title” to the claim have 
sufficient standing to sue, even if they remit all of the “beneficial interest” to another 
party). I have posed this argument before, see Campos, supra note 27, at 1076–79 (dis-
cussing the dispositive control the class attorney receives through the class action). 
 137. I say “per se” because there are, of course, concerns with agency costs, which 
have preoccupied class action scholars. See ALI, supra note 19, § 3.13(a) cmt. b. But, as I 
have argued previously, these agency concerns can be addressed without requiring the 
consent of the class members. See Campos, supra note 27, at 1115–17. 
 138. For a formal discussion and model of this, see Bruce L. Hay, Asymmetric Re-
wards: Why Class Actions (May) Settle For Too Little, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 479 (1997) (ar-
guing that class attorneys may suboptimally settle claims if they do not have dispositive 
control and a sufficient beneficial interest over all of them). 
 139. The converse is also true, since owning legal title without a beneficial interest 
also would not amount to much. Cf. Sprint, 544 U.S. at 300–01 (Roberts, J., dissenting) 
(questioning whether plaintiffs with legal title but no beneficial interest in a claim have 
sufficient standing for Article III purposes, since “‘[w]hen you got nothing, you got noth-
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Consequently, the class action cannot be understood as a device that 
solves the problem of insufficient stakes in small claims litigation with-
out also being understood as a trust device. Indeed, courts generally rec-
ognize that it is not the representative who controls investments, but the 
class attorney. This is because the class attorney, “unlike the representa-
tive plaintiff[,] receive[s] compensation reflecting any benefits conferred 
on the class as a whole,” thus making her “willing to underwrite the 
costs.”140 In essence, the class attorney is the “real party in interest,”141 
and locating standing among the various plaintiffs is, for the most part, a 
fiction to assuage concerns about the Rules Enabling Act.142 
More importantly, the trust function of the class action does not entail 
an all-at-once determination of any issues. The trust function of the class 
action facilitates investment in common issues by providing sufficient 
incentive for the class attorney to invest in the case. This trust function, 
however, does not require the resolution of all common issues in one fell 
swoop. In fact, so long as the class attorney can make common invest-
ments and maintain overall control over the claims, a class action can 
proceed through completely individual actions. Just like an attorney who 
expressly represents all of the plaintiffs in a case, a class attorney could 
choose to file individual suits rather than file a class action, while invest-
ing in common issues in the background. Indeed, a court could determine 
                                                                                                             
ing to lose’” (quoting BOB DYLAN, Like A Rolling Stone, on HIGHWAY 61 REVISITED (Co-
lumbia Records 1965))). 
 140. See Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J.) 
(rejecting district court finding that the class representative was not adequate because he 
or she would not bear the total costs of the litigation, noting that “[t]he very feature that 
makes class treatment appropriate—small individual stakes and large aggregate ones—
ensures that the representative will be unwilling to vouch for the entire costs. Only a lu-
natic would do so. A madman is not a good representative of the class!”). 
 141. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a) (providing that “[a]n action must be prosecuted in the name 
of the real party in interest,” including “a trustee of an express trust”). 
 142. Specifically, courts have interpreted the assignment of a cause of action as a mat-
ter of “substance” that cannot be modified by rules of civil procedure like Rule 23. See 28 
U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006) (prohibiting any rule that “abridge[s], enlarge[s], or modif[ies] 
any substantive right”); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 
F.2d 78, 83 (4th Cir. 1973) (“Whether a plaintiff is entitled to enforce the asserted right is 
determined according to the substantive law.”). Cf. 6A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. 
MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1545 (4th ed. 2010) 
(concluding that substantive law relating to the assignment of claims is the basis for the 
real-party-in-interest rule). I address this concern in a prior work and in a current project 
on the Rules Enabling Act. See Campos, supra note 27, at 1117–21; see also Sergio J. 
Campos, Erie as a Choice of Enforcement Defaults, 64 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) 
(on file with author). 
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both common issues and each plaintiff’s damages in individual suits, al-
lowing the common issues to “mature” over time.143 
The trust function of the class action shows that the class action can 
provide many of the beneficial features of consolidation procedures such 
as multidistrict litigation. Scholars have praised the use of multidistrict 
litigation as a substitute for class actions because it allows for separate 
suits while permitting better coordination among the plaintiffs for com-
mon benefit work.144 A class action, however, can mimic these same fea-
tures. In fact, multidistrict litigation, like the class action, often results in 
the assignment of collective control to attorneys, with some scholars go-
ing so far as to call such multidistrict litigation “quasi-class actions.”145 
B. The Extraordinary Remedy Fallacy 
In New Motor Vehicles, the First Circuit found no predominance of 
common issues because of the potential variance among the class mem-
bers’ injuries, which, in the court’s view, would necessitate individual-
ized trials.146 The court added, however, that without a “searching in-
quiry” of the plaintiffs’ “novel and complex” theory of injury, “many 
resources will be wasted setting up a trial that plaintiffs cannot win.”147 
Indeed, earlier in the opinion, the First Circuit noted that 
[i]nterlocutory appeals from class certification under Rule 23(f) are es-
pecially appropriate where the plaintiffs’ theory is novel or where a 
doubtful class certification results in financial exposure to defendants 
so great as to provide substantial incentives for defendants to settle 
                                                                                                             
 143. See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. 
REV. 659 (1989) (discussing the benefits of having common issues “mature” through 
separate actions); see also Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748–49 (5th Cir. 
1996) (same); In re Dow Corning Corp., 211 B.R. 545, 576, 579 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
1997) (same). 
 144. Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation if a Class 
Action is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205, 2206 (2008); see also Roger Trangsrud, 
Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 779, 820–22 (1985). 
 145. See Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of 
Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 
109–10 (2010) (noting that multi-district litigation in which judges have unfettered dis-
cretion to appoint lead counsel are recognized as “quasi-class actions”); see also ALI, 
supra note 19, § 1.05 cmt. a (“[A] common structural feature of all aggregate proceedings 
[is] the loss of control of litigation by persons whose interests are at issue.”). 
 146. In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Export Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 26–28 (1st 
Cir. 2008). 
 147. Id. at 26, 29. 
778 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 37:3 
nonmeritorious cases in an effort to avoid both risk of liability and liti-
gation expense.148 
The First Circuit is not alone. Nearly all circuits have emphasized “‘[t]he 
effect of a class certification in inducing settlement to curtail the risk of 
large awards.’”149 
One of the strongest examples of this concern can be found in Oscar 
Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom Co.,150 where the Fifth 
Circuit reviewed the denial of a securities fraud class action.151 As back-
ground, plaintiffs in securities fraud class actions are required to prove 
their reliance on the alleged fraudulent statements in buying or selling 
their shares.152 Like the reliance requirement in McLaughlin, the reliance 
requirement in securities fraud litigation is an individual issue that could 
prevent the plaintiffs from satisfying the predominance requirement.153 
However, unlike in cases like McLaughlin, the parties can satisfy the 
predominance requirement by establishing the “fraud-on-the-market” 
presumption, which is a rebuttable presumption that every member of the 
class relied on the alleged fraud if the security was traded on an efficient 
market.154 
                                                                                                             
 148. Id. at 8 (citing Tardiff v. Knox Cnty., 365 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2004); Waste Mgmt. 
Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 293 (1st Cir. 2000)). 
 149. Id. (quoting West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 937 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(Easterbook, J.)); see also Oscar Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 
487 F.3d 261, 267 (5th Cir. 2007), overruled by Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton 
Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011) (“We cannot ignore the in terrorem power of certification.”); 
In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that 
class actions may “create unwarranted pressure to settle nonmeritorious claims on the 
part of defendants.” (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 
F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2001))); McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 231 (2d 
Cir. 2008) (noting that “[p]ossible recoveries [may] run into astronomical amount [and] 
generate more leverage and pressure on defendants to settle” (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & 
Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1019 (2d Cir. 1973))); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 558–59 (2007) (noting potential of “in terrorem” suits to induce settle-
ments in the context of antitrust class action). 
 150.  487 F.3d 261. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Specifically, “reliance is an element of a Rule 10b-5 cause of action” based on 
fraud because reliance “provides the requisite causal connection between a defendant’s 
misrepresentation and a plaintiff’s injury.” Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 
(1988); see also Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005) (reaffirming that 
“reliance” or “transaction causation” is an element of a § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim). 
 153. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 227–30 (noting the difficulty of satisfying the predomi-
nance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) in securities fraud class actions given the need to 
prove reliance on an individual basis). 
 154. Id. (discussing the presumption). I discuss the presumption in more detail below. 
See infra Part II.C.2. In addition, and as I discuss below, in McLaughlin the Second Cir-
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Prior to Oscar, the Fifth Circuit held that proof of loss causation, or 
proof that the alleged fraudulent statement caused a change in the stock 
price, was a prerequisite for establishing the fraud-on-the-market pre-
sumption for purposes of summary judgment.155 In Oscar, the Fifth Cir-
cuit considered whether the plaintiffs had to prove loss causation to ob-
tain certification of a securities fraud class action in the first place.156 
This is of particular significance to securities fraud class actions because 
loss causation is also an element of a securities fraud claim.157 Thus, re-
quiring the plaintiffs to prove loss causation to establish the fraud-on-the-
market presumption at the class certification stage would, in effect, re-
quire the plaintiffs to prove the merits of their claims to certify a class. 
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs did have to prove loss 
causation, noting that it could not “ignore the in terrorem power of class 
certification.”158 The Oscar court did not stop there. It went on to point 
out numerous limitations to the class action caused by amendments to 
Rule 23 and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, noting that 
these changes “recognize that a district court’s certification order often 
bestows upon plaintiffs extraordinary leverage, and its bite should dictate 
the process that precedes it.”159 
Scholars have also commented on or criticized the extraordinary lever-
age a class action bestows upon plaintiffs, which may place undue set-
tlement pressure on defendants.160 In fact, shortly after the passage of the 
1966 amendments permitting damage class actions under Rule 23,161 the 
great Judge Friendly lambasted the “blackmail settlements” caused by 
the class action.162 
                                                                                                             
cuit rejected the use of a similar fraud-on-the-market presumption in civil RICO litiga-
tion. See id.; see also McLaughlin, 522 F.3d at 224 n.5 (rejecting use of the fraud-on-the-
market presumption in civil RICO litigation). 
 155. Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 662, 665–66 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 156. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 266. 
 157. Dura, 544 U.S. at 341. 
 158. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 267. 
 159. Id. 
 160. E.g., Lester Brickman, On the Relevance of the Admissibility of Scientific Evi-
dence: Tort System Outcomes are Principally Determined by Lawyers’ Rates of Return, 
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1755, 1780–82 (1994); Peter H. Shuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional 
Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 941, 958 (1995); see also Bruce Hay & 
David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality 
and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1378 nn.4–6 (2000) (citing the scholarly 
literature on “blackmail” class action settlements). 
 161. See generally Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District 
Courts, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966) (discussing creation of Rule 23(b)(3) category). 
 162. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 118–20 (1973); 
see also Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Anti-
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This concern with the extraordinary leverage of the class action is par-
tially due to the all-at-once fallacy. For support of the view that class 
actions put undue pressure on defendants to settle, courts have cited In re 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.163 There, the Seventh Circuit reviewed a peti-
tion for a writ of mandamus challenging the certification of a class action 
of claims related to blood allegedly tainted with the HIV virus.164 The 
district court proposed certifying a class action to decide common issues 
of liability, with the remaining issues decided in individual trials.165 
The Seventh Circuit court granted the writ of mandamus, ordering the 
district court to vacate the class certification order. In an opinion by 
Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit pointed out that the plaintiffs had lost 
twelve of thirteen individual actions, and the defendants “are likely to 
win most of the remaining ones as well.”166 Since the class could run 
well into the thousands, the Seventh Circuit concluded that a writ of 
mandamus was warranted given “the sheer magnitude of the risk to 
which the class action, in contrast to the individual actions pending or 
likely, expose[d]” the defendants.167 According to the court, separate ac-
tions reduce this error risk because they provide “a pooling of judgment . 
. . of many different tribunals.”168 
As argued above,169 the class action does not require an all-at-once 
resolution of common issues. Thus, the class action can take advantage 
of the pooling of judgment of many trials. In fact, a class action do so by 
allowing the plaintiffs, under the direction of the class attorney, to sue 
separately in their preferred forums. 
                                                                                                             
trust Suits—the Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1971) 
(discussing “blackmail” class actions in the antitrust context, and inspiring Judge Friend-
ly’s views on the topic). 
 163. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.); see, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 
84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that “[i]n addition to skewing trial outcomes, 
class certification creates insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle, whereas indi-
vidual trials would not” (citing Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1298)). Cf. Klay v. Humana, 
Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Rhone-Poulenc, but noting that 
“[m]ere pressure to settle is not a sufficient reason for a court to avoid certifying an oth-
erwise meritorious class action suit”). 
 164. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1294. Rule 23 has since been amended to permit the 
interlocutory appeal of class certification orders. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
 165. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A) (permitting issue only class actions). 
 166. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1298. 
 167. Id. at 1297 (emphasis in original). 
 168. Id. at 1300. 
 169. See supra Part II.A; see also Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 160, at 1382 (noting 
the availability of multiple trials in a class action to reduce error risk in deciding common 
issues). 
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But the Seventh Circuit echoes a widely shared view that the class ac-
tion is analogous to extraordinary remedies, such as the preliminary in-
junction, that should only be awarded based on a likelihood of success on 
the merits.170 The writ of mandamus at issue in Rhone-Poulenc is itself a 
remedy that is “issued only in extraordinary cases,” and is only awarded 
when the challenged order would, among other things, cause “irreparable 
harm.”171 The Rhone-Poulenc court concluded that irreparable harm 
would result from the class certification order because the plaintiffs’ 
claims were not likely to be meritorious, yet would likely lead to, among 
other things, a “blackmail settlement” that could not be undone by appel-
late review.172 In fact, some scholars have argued explicitly for a merits 
inquiry prior to class certification precisely because of the class action’s 
extraordinary ability to significantly increase the leverage of the plain-
tiffs.173 
Many courts follow similar logic in concluding that the class action, 
like a preliminary injunction, should only be certified based on a likeli-
hood of success on the merits for the plaintiffs. But they do so somewhat 
clandestinely. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,174 a fairly early decision 
concerning Rule 23(b)(3), the district court assigned notice costs to the 
defendant based on a finding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on 
                                                                                                             
 170. E.g., Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (noting that 
preliminary injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon 
a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief”); see also Mazurek v. Arm-
strong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) (“It frequently is observed that a prelimi-
nary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted 
unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” (quoting 11A 
CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948 (2d ed. 1995))). 
 171. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1294–95. 
 172. The court ultimately concluded that the “irreparable injury” here was sufficient 
given that, along with the undue settlement pressure that would be created by the class 
action, the proposed class action could lead to a reexamination of issues in violation of 
the parties’ Seventh Amendment rights. Id. at 1299. But, as I have argued previously, 
bifurcation along the lines proposed by the district court in Rhone-Poulenc would not 
result in any reexamination of issues. See Campos, supra note 27, at 1073. 
 173. See Bone & Evans, supra note 19, at 1254; Hazard, supra note 19, at 3–6. Others 
have at least noted the potential for class actions to lead to the settlement of nonmeritori-
ous claims, although many disagree as to the precise effect. See Janet Cooper Alexander, 
Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. 
REV. 497 (1991); Reinier Kraakman, Hyun Park & Steven Shavell, When Are Sharehold-
er Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1733 (1994); Roberta Romano, The 
Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55 (1991); Joel 
Seligman, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor Grundfest’s “Disimplying 
Private Rights of Action under the Federal Securities Laws:The Commission’s Authori-
ty,” 108 HARV. L. REV. 438 (1994). 
 174. 417 U.S. 167 (1974). 
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the merits.175 The district court did so by explicitly analogizing the class 
action to a “preliminary injunction.”176 The Eisen Court, however, vacat-
ed the district court’s order because it “f[ound] nothing in either the lan-
guage or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a 
preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether 
it may be maintained as a class action.”177 Thus, under Eisen, a district 
court deciding to certify a class action cannot review the merits unless it 
has authority to do so under Rule 23. 
As it turns out, courts have found a way to review the merits at the 
class certification stage by insisting on proof of classwide injury to satis-
fy the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). After all, to provide 
proof of “common answers” as to injury, plaintiffs must prove a common 
injury. Accordingly, this “overlap” between the predominance require-
ment and the merits permits courts to review the merits without running 
afoul of Eisen.178 In New Motor Vehicles, for example, the court held that 
the district court must test the plaintiffs’ “novel and complex” theory of 
common impact, both to satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 
23(b)(3) and to avoid “a doubtful class certification” that puts undue 
pressure on the defendants to settle.179 Similarly, in Oscar, the court con-
cluded that proof of loss causation was both “central to the certification 
decision,” as well as necessary given the “in terrorem power of certifica-
tion.”180 
In some cases the overlap between the “predominance” requirement 
and the merits leads to overreaching. In Oscar, for example, the insist-
ence on proof of loss causation to support a finding of predominance is 
unwarranted for at least two reasons. First, proof of loss causation is 
                                                                                                             
 175. Id. at 179. 
 176. Id. at 168. 
 177. Id. at 177; see also Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note 19, at 100 (discuss-
ing Eisen and acknowledging that “Rule 23 does not require proponents of class certifica-
tion to satisfy a preliminary injunction-like standard cast in terms of the likelihood of 
success on the merits”). 
 178. See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 33–34 (2d Cir. 
2006) (concluding that requiring proof of classwide injury in a securities fraud class ac-
tion does not violate Eisen because such proof is required to satisfy the predominance 
requirement); see also Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note 19, at 100 (noting, and 
approving, trend by courts to “make a ‘definite assessment’ that the [class action] re-
quirements have been met, even if that assessment entails the resolution of conflicting 
proof and happens to overlap with an issue—even a critical one—on the merits”). 
 179. In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Export Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 8, 28 (1st Cir. 
2008). 
 180. Oscar Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 267 
(5th Cir. 2007), overruled by Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 
(2011). 
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common to the class. Either the fraud affected the share price or it did 
not. Second, and more importantly, proof of loss causation is unrelated to 
proof of transaction causation, because proof of any price change caused 
by the fraud (as opposed to other causes) does not necessarily imply 
proof of reliance by each investor. Indeed, the Supreme Court focused on 
this reason in reversing Oscar.181 In fact, insofar as the fraud-on-the-
market presumption establishes loss causation by permitting an inference 
that any fraud in an efficient market would affect the price, insisting on 
proof of loss causation would “requir[e] the plaintiffs to prove . . . the 
very facts that are to be presumed.”182 
More generally, the extraordinary remedy fallacy, like the all-at-once 
fallacy, is itself flawed because it takes a mistaken view of the function 
of the class action. As discussed earlier, the class action can be under-
stood as a trust device that assigns dispositive control over the plaintiffs’ 
claims, plus an interest in any potential net recovery, to the class attor-
ney.183 In doing so, the class action allows the class attorney to spread the 
costs of investments in common issues among all of the plaintiffs.184 
Moreover, the class attorney will have an incentive to invest in common 
issues because he or she will have a partial interest in the plaintiffs’ total 
net recovery. 
But why go through the ordeal of certifying a class action to econo-
mize on common investments? It may turn out that, from the plaintiffs’ 
perspective, the costs of litigation simply fail to justify the litigation, 
even when they are spread across the entire class.185 Admittedly, much 
has been said about increasing access to justice, particularly in light of 
other developments in civil procedure doctrine.186 In small claims litiga-
                                                                                                             
 181. Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. at 2186, overruling Oscar, 487 F.3d 261 (noting that 
proof of loss causation “has nothing to do with whether an investor relied on the misrep-
resentation in the first place, either directly or presumptively through the fraud-on-the-
market theory”). 
 182. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 274 (Dennis, J., dissenting); see also Nagareda, Class Certifi-
cation, supra note 19, at 140 (criticizing Oscar on these grounds). 
 183. See supra Part II.A. 
 184. Campos, supra note 27, at 1077–79; see also Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Ac-
tions, supra note 27, at 395. 
 185. For an extreme example, see Kamilewicz v. Bank of Bos., 92 F.3d 506, 508, 512 
(7th Cir. 1996) (upholding a state-court class action settlement in which a class member 
received $2.19 but was assessed a fee of $91.33). 
 186. See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 353, 353–54 (2010) (criticizing a “restrictive ethos” among courts in 
which rules pertaining to pleading, case management, and the class action, among others, 
are “being developed, interpreted, and applied in a manner that frustrates the ability of 
claimants to prosecute their claims and receive a decision on the merits in federal court”). 
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tion, however, the stakes for an individual plaintiff do not seem to justify 
the extraordinary measures needed for the class action. In fact, most 
small claims plaintiffs never bother to collect whatever the class attorney 
happens to recover.187 
The trust function of the class action makes more sense once one con-
siders the defendant’s incentives to invest in common issues. Unlike the 
plaintiffs, the defendant owns all of the expected liability associated with 
any common issue.188 Thus, the defendant does not need a class action to 
aggregate the stakes and spread the costs of investments in common is-
sues. It follows that, in the absence of a class action, the defendant will 
invest more in common issues than the plaintiffs because the defendant 
has more at stake. 
Moreover, the plaintiffs cannot voluntarily match the stakes of the de-
fendant, such as through joinder or informal aggregation, because of col-
lective action problems caused by market limitations, transaction costs, 
and strategic behavior.189 Put another way, legal limits on selling a claim, 
the costs of coordinating the plaintiffs’ common investments, and the 
potential for free-riding and hold-outs, make it impossible for the plain-
tiffs to match the stakes of the defendant, at least voluntarily. 
Consequently, the class action is utilized in small claims litigation be-
cause of the asymmetry of stakes.190 The class action, in effect, equalizes 
the stakes between the plaintiffs and the defendant by incentivizing the 
class attorney to invest in common issues as if he or she had the entire 
amount at stake. It does so to correct the bias in favor of the defendant in 
the litigation. Otherwise, the defendant in small claims litigation can es-
cape significant liability because of its advantage in investing in common 
issues. Thus, even if the plaintiffs are indifferent to recovering in a small 
claims class action, the class action at least prevents the defendant from 
enjoying the fruits of its illegality.191 
                                                                                                             
 187. See Gilles, supra note 112, at 315 (noting that “[i]nvariably, in small-claims con-
sumer class actions, less than twenty percent or so of class action damages funds are dis-
tributed to plaintiff claimants” (citing Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: 
Collective Action Problems and Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 120 
(2007)). 
 188. This expected liability is the flipside of the expected recovery for the plaintiffs. 
See Campos, supra note 27, at 1074–76. 
 189. See id. at 1079–81. 
 190. See id. (discussing the asymmetry). Cf. ROBERT G. BONE, THE ECONOMICS OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 246–48 (2003) (discussing the problem of “asymmetric stakes” in the 
context of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel). 
 191. This concern with preventing the defendant from escaping its liability has an ob-
vious deterrence function, which I will discuss in more detail later when I discuss the 
defendant’s ex-ante conduct. See infra Part II.C. 
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Admittedly, the class action increases the leverage of the plaintiffs, but 
the whole point of the class action is to do precisely that. In the absence 
of the class action, the defendant has an inherent advantage in leverage 
that can allow it to avoid some or all of the liability associated with any 
common issue. As noted by Richard Nagareda, even if the class action 
increases the plaintiffs’ leverage and increases the settlement pressure on 
the defendant, it does not necessarily mean that this increase is unjusti-
fied.192 This is particularly so when the claims are small and the alterna-
tive to a class action is no litigation at all. In fact, ensuring the parties 
negotiate on a level playing field is necessary to prevent the class attor-
ney from selling out the plaintiffs’ interests by accepting a too-low, 
“sweetheart” settlement with the defendant.193 
Accordingly, a merits determination prior to class certification defeats 
the purpose of the class action. The class action is designed to permit the 
plaintiffs to invest in the merits on equal terms with the defendant. Thus, 
a class action only works if it is available before a court decides the mer-
its, not after. As put by Judge Torruella’s dissent in New Motor Vehicles: 
In this case, an inquiry that tests each stage of the plaintiffs’ theory is, 
in effect, an assessment of the case’s merits. As such, we are putting 
the cart before the horse and turning the class certification stage into a 
motion for summary judgment proceeding—the appropriate juncture at 
which to fully vet the viability of the plaintiffs’ theory.194 
In fact, in putting the cart before the horse by examining the merits be-
fore class certification, courts are allowing defendants to escape some or 
all of their liability. 
C. The Individualist Fallacy 
The all-at-once fallacy presumes that the class action requires an all-at-
once determination of all issues. But the all-at-once fallacy relies on a 
further premise. It presumes that separate actions are required to resolve 
issues that are specific to each individual plaintiff. Thus, if the fact of 
injury cannot be proven on a classwide basis, then it must be determined 
separately for each plaintiff. This further premise is what I call the indi-
vidualist fallacy. 
                                                                                                             
 192. RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 43–48 (2007). 
 193. Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 160, at 1379–82 (discussing sweetheart settlements 
and the need for a mandatory class action to curtail them). 
 194. In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Export Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 32 (1st Cir. 
2008) (Torruella, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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The individualist fallacy is motivated by the need to prevent uninjured 
plaintiffs from recovering.195 In Neurontin, which is discussed earlier, the 
district court denied class certification of a class allegedly harmed by the 
fraudulent marketing of the drug Neurontin as a pain reliever.196 The 
court was persuaded by the evidence of the plaintiffs’ expert, which 
showed the aggregate damages caused by the fraudulent marketing 
scheme.197 However, the district court rejected the plaintiffs’ proposed 
procedure for distributing the damages.198 The court recognized that a 
“fluid recovery” or “cy pres” process, in which the aggregate amount of 
damages is assessed and then later distributed to the class, can be permis-
sible in a class action even if the procedure does not guarantee “absolute 
precision.”199 According to the court, however, a “fluid recovery” proce-
dure cannot “circumvent the bedrock principle that members of a class 
must be identifiable.”200 Thus, the proposed procedure was fatally flawed 
because it “failed to articulate a method of identifying any members of 
the consumer class.”201 
Like the previous fallacies, the individualist fallacy appears to be a 
matter of common sense. Shouldn’t individual issues be determined in 
individual trials? Why should uninjured plaintiffs recover? But like the 
previous fallacies, the individualist fallacy is mistaken. This is so for 
three reasons. 
1. Accuracy 
First, the individualist fallacy is mistaken because individual trials are 
not necessarily more accurate than common, all-at-once trials in deter-
mining whether each plaintiff was injured. As an initial matter, the indi-
vidual evidence of injury may be unreliable. Eyewitness testimony, for 
example, is notoriously unreliable—memories fade, individuals often 
color past events when recalling them, and the plaintiffs are far from dis-
interested parties.202 Moreover, given the low monetary amounts at stake 
                                                                                                             
 195. Gilles, supra note 112, at 310 (discussing, and criticizing, courts’ “[u]neasiness 
with disunity—with the possibility of compensating uninjured parties”). 
 196. In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Pracs. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 89, 91 (D. Mass. 2007); 
see also supra Part I (discussing Neurontin). 
 197. Id. at 111 (“Based on this preliminary record, I conclude that [the] proposed 
methodology is a plausible way of determining aggregate class-wide liability.”). 
 198. Id. at 111–13. 
 199. Id. at 112 (quoting 3 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 105, § 10:5). 
 200. Id. at 113. 
 201. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 202. This point has been made extensively in the criminal context. See Suzannah B. 
Gambell, The Need to Revisit the Neil v. Biggers Factors: Suppressing Unreliable Eye-
witness Identifications, 6 WYO. L. REV. 189, 196–202 (2006); see also State v. Hender-
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in small claims litigation, it is unlikely that any individual plaintiff would 
preserve relevant evidence.203 
More importantly, individual trials are not necessarily more accurate 
than common ones because the evidence of each plaintiff’s injury may 
not be unique to each plaintiff. As argued above, the difficulty in proving 
classwide injury arises from counterfactual uncertainty.204 The plaintiffs 
cannot prove that every plaintiff was injured by the defendant’s alleged 
conduct because there is uncertainty as to whether some of the plaintiffs 
were in the same position or better off in the absence of the alleged legal 
violation. If the plaintiffs could identify which plaintiffs were, in fact, not 
injured, they would simply exclude them from the class. Thus, proving 
classwide injury requires evidence of the counterfactual that would 
demonstrate which specific plaintiffs were, in fact, injured. 
If establishing classwide injury turns on proof of the counterfactual, it 
may turn out that evidence of the counterfactual may be common to 
some or all of the class members. In Klay, for example, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit concluded that it did not “strain credulity to conclude” that each of 
the plaintiff doctors relied on the HMOs’ representations that the plain-
tiffs would be paid in accordance with the terms of their contracts.205 In 
so concluding, the Eleventh Circuit relied on its judgment and experience 
as to how a doctor would behave in negotiating contracts with HMOs, 
both with and without the fraud.206 In contrast, the Second Circuit could 
not provide the same benefit of the doubt to the smokers that comprised 
the class in McLaughlin. There, the court could imagine some smokers in 
the class who would have smoked light cigarettes even in the absence of 
the fraud. Indeed, the district court in McLaughlin acknowledged that 
possibility as well.207 But the larger point is that the evidence of the 
                                                                                                             
son, 27 A.3d 872, 894–922 (N.J. 2011) (overruling, in a criminal case, previous rule on 
eyewitness testimony based on recent research on the unreliability of such testimony). 
 203. Gilles, supra note 112, at 316 (noting that in small claims consumer class actions 
“[n]o one keeps the receipt for a pineapple”). 
 204. See supra Part I. 
 205. Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 206. Greiner, supra note 70, at 560 (noting that “[t]he trier of fact in individual cases 
uses the evidence presented at trial and its own understanding of how the world works to 
fill in the missing potential outcome and, subject to other relevant legal principles, de-
cides the case accordingly”). 
 207. Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1021 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(Weinstein, J.), overruled by McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 
2008) (noting that “the amount of economic damages it suffered appears to be quite 
weak—and plaintiffs have been less than candid in failing to acknowledge that deficiency 
in their proof”). 
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counterfactual may point in the direction of similarity (reliance by doc-
tors) rather than dissimilarity (reliance by smokers). 
In fact, individual actions utilize common evidence all the time. In in-
dividual mass tort actions, for example, plaintiffs often prove injury by 
analogizing to other cases, in effect importing the counterfactual from 
one case to another.208 Indeed, a classwide proceeding could improve 
upon the use of common evidence in individual actions by using statisti-
cal techniques to avoid any biases.209 
2. Avoiding Compensating Uninjured Plaintiffs 
As noted above, the individualist fallacy demands accurate measures of 
injury for each individual plaintiff to prevent uninjured plaintiffs from 
recovering. But the individualist fallacy is further mistaken because there 
is, in fact, no “bedrock principle” prohibiting uninjured plaintiffs from 
recovering.210 
Consider, for example, the fraud-on-the-market presumption in securi-
ties fraud litigation.211 The Supreme Court first blessed the presumption 
in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,212 a case in which the plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendant “made three public statements denying that it was engaged in 
merger negotiations,” but nevertheless announced a merger about three 
months after those statements.213 The plaintiffs were shareholders who 
sold their stock in the period between the statements denying the merger 
talks and the announcement of the merger, when the price of the stock 
was “artificially depressed.”214 To recover, the plaintiffs were required to 
prove their reliance on the fraudulent misstatements in selling their 
shares.215 Nevertheless, the district court certified the class by permitting 
                                                                                                             
 208. Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury 
Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 967 (1993) (noting that “[i]n 
mass litigation, the likely amount that one plaintiff will receive for a claim depends upon 
the values of other claims”). 
 209. Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial By Formula,” 90 TEX. L. REV. 571, 
612–18 (2012) (arguing for the use of statistical methods in aggregate proceedings to 
avoid outcome bias among plaintiffs); see also Greiner, supra note 70, at 534 (discussing 
“potential outcomes” approach that seeks to approximate a randomized experiment to 
produce strong inferences with respect to issues of fact in civil rights cases). 
 210. In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Pracs. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 89, 113 (D. Mass. 2007) 
(identifying the “bedrock principle” of preventing uninjured plaintiffs from recovering). 
 211. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247–48 (1988) (discussing the presump-
tion); see also supra Part II.B (same). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 227–28. 
 214. Id. at 228. 
 215. Id. at 243. 
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the plaintiffs to presume reliance based on the fact that the shares were 
traded on an efficient market. 
The Supreme Court found no error in establishing such a fraud-on-the-
market presumption. The Court stated that 
[t]he fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an 
open and developed securities market, the price of a company’s stock is 
determined by the available material information regarding the compa-
ny and its business . . . . Misleading statements will therefore defraud 
purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the 
misstatements.216 
The Court further noted that the defendants could rebut the presumption 
but suggested that any such showing should occur at trial.217 
Admittedly, the fraud-on-the-market presumption only presumes 
classwide reliance, not “economic loss.”218 However, once the presump-
tion has been established, courts have further presumed injury, since “the 
price at which the stock is traded is presumably affected by the fraudu-
lent information, thus injuring every investor who trades in the securi-
ty.”219 
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the availability of the fraud-
on-the-market presumption.220 Few courts, however, have extended the 
use of such a presumption beyond the securities context. In McLaughlin, 
for example, the court went to great lengths to disavow the use of a 
fraud-on-the-market presumption for the plaintiffs’ civil RICO fraud 
                                                                                                             
 216. Id. at 241–42 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
For support of the “fraud on the market theory,” the Court noted that then “[r]ecent em-
pirical studies” concerning the efficient capital markets hypothesis (“ECMH”) “have 
tended to confirm Congress’ premise that the market price of shares traded on well-
developed markets reflects all publicly available information, and, hence, any material 
misrepresentations,” although it disclaimed from adopting the efficient capital market 
hypothesis (at least in its strong form) completely. Id. at 246, 246 n.24; see also Eugene 
F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1575 (1991) (discussing ECMH). 
 217. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 248. 
 218. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (noting that “reli-
ance” and “economic loss” are two separate elements of a securities fraud claim); New-
ton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 179–80 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(vacating certification of securities fraud class action where classwide reliance was pre-
sumed, but economic loss could not be established through common proof). 
 219. Newton, 259 F.3d at 179 (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 
F.3d 1410, 1419 n.8 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
 220. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011). 
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claims.221 The court stressed that “Basic involved an efficient market” 
while “the market for consumer goods . . . is anything but efficient.”222 
But despite its name, the fraud-on-the-market presumption does not ac-
tually establish classwide reliance, at least not in the sense understood in 
cases such as McLaughlin. Instead, it only shows that the fraudulent 
statements would cause a change in the price of the security.223 Accord-
ingly, the only reliance established by the fraud-on-the-market presump-
tion is the plaintiffs’ “reliance on the integrity of th[e] price.”224 Neither 
courts nor scholars pretend that such reliance is a presumption “that all 
investors actually read, heard, or were otherwise aware of the alleged 
misrepresentation.”225 An investor can get a tip from his uncle, rely on 
the “integrity of the price,” and recover without having any knowledge of 
the misrepresentation. In McLaughlin, a lack of classwide proof of such 
knowledge was fatal to class certification. In Basic, this lack of 
knowledge was irrelevant.226 
                                                                                                             
 221. In fact, the Second Circuit accused the plaintiffs of “invok[ing] the fraud-on-the-
market presumption set forth in Basic” when the plaintiffs explicitly represented that they 
“are not advocating the same ‘fraud-on-the-market’ presumption applicable in a securities 
case.” McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 224, 224 n.5 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 222. Id. at 224. 
 223. In fact, if the fraud-on-the-market presumption establishes anything, it demon-
strates “loss causation,” or “a causal connection between the material misrepresentation 
and the loss.” Dura, 544 U.S. at 342. Even then, the fraud-on-the-market presumption 
does not conclusively establish loss causation since it only establishes that an efficient 
market would have been sensitive to the fraud. The presumption does not show that any 
price adjustment was in fact caused by the fraud as opposed to other causes. Cf. Hallibur-
ton, 131 S. Ct. at 2168 (noting that fraud-on-the-market presumption should not be con-
fused with a showing that a “misrepresentation that affected the integrity of the market 
price also caused a subsequent economic loss.”). 
 224. Basic v. Levinson, Inc., 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988). 
 225. Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 
WIS. L. REV. 151, 158 (noting that the fraud on the market presumption does not presume 
actual reliance by the plaintiffs); Stark Trading v. Falconbridge Ltd., 552 F.3d 568, 572 
(7th Cir. 2009) (Posner, J.) (“[A] fraud affects the price of a publicly traded security [be-
cause] investors will be affected even if they trade without knowledge of the misrepresen-
tations that influenced the price at which they traded.”) (emphasis added); Merritt B. Fox, 
After Dura: Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 31 J. CORP. L. 829, 839 (2006) 
(noting that “[f]raud-on-the-market actions are distinctly different from actions based on 
traditional reliance,” since they do not require a plaintiff “to show that she would have 
acted differently but for the wrongful misstatement”). 
 226. In fact, the Basic court came close to eliminating the reliance requirement alto-
gether. Langevoort, supra note 225, at 162, 162 n.45 (noting that Justice Brennan pushed 
Justice Blackmun to adopt a position “in which all persons trading at a distorted price 
were entitled to the presumption, and found little reason to create grounds for rebuttal”). 
Moreover, early articulations of the fraud-on-the-market presumption did not invoke 
reliance at all. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906–07 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that 
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A similar presumption is employed in antitrust price-fixing cases, 
where plaintiffs allege that competitors conspired to fix the price of a 
good above the competitive price.227 As in cases that permit the fraud-on-
the-market presumption, courts have permitted plaintiffs to presume 
classwide injury in price-fixing cases because “an illegal price-fixing 
scheme presumptively damages all purchasers of a price-fixed product in 
an affected market.”228 In fact, a court is permitted to calculate damages 
for each plaintiff based simply on the “overcharge”—the difference be-
tween the inflated price and “what prices would have been without the 
unlawful conduct.”229 
The price-fixing context seems to avoid the counterfactual uncertainty 
found in cases like New Motor Vehicles because the shift in the “base-
line” of the price—from the competitive price to the fixed price—is the 
same for every class member. Accordingly, courts have consistently re-
fused to use such “baseline” damages where, as in New Motor Vehicles, 
the parties have the option to negotiate or contract around prices to avoid 
any loss.230 Courts have refused to presume impact even in price-fixing 
cases where the “baseline” price is not the same for the entire class, sug-
gesting that such variation reintroduces the counterfactual uncertainty 
traditional price-fixing cases avoid.231 
                                                                                                             
“proof of subjective reliance on particular misrepresentations is unnecessary to establish 
a 10b-5 claim for a deception inflating the price of stock traded in the open market,” re-
quiring instead only “proof of purchase and the materiality of the misrepresentations”). 
 227. Horizontal price-fixing among competitors is per se illegal under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust 
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be ille-
gal.”); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 228 (1940) (“[P]rice-
fixing combinations . . . are illegal per se; they are not evaluated in terms of their pur-
pose, aim or effect in the elimination of so-called competitive evils.”). 
 228. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 179 n.21 
(3d Cir. 2001) (quoting In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 169 F.R.D. 493, 
526 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)); see also In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 230 
F.R.D. 61, 93 (D. Mass. 2005) (accepting plaintiffs’ argument that “it may be assumed in 
[price-fixing] cases that by preventing competition in a typical market defendants have 
raised prices to all purchasers”). 
 229. 6 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 105, § 18:53 (noting that this method 
can be used to determine “classwide damages” in price-fixing cases). 
 230. Pharm. Indus., 230 F.R.D. at 94 (rejecting a “baseline-impact” method for deter-
mining damages for civil RICO claims given that “the PBM, wholesale, and pharmacy 
markets for the procurement of prescription drugs are highly-competitive; therefore, un-
like in a price fixing conspiracy, ‘payors can leverage this competition to dissipate the 
effects of the alleged AWP scheme’”). 
 231. See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 325–26 (3d Cir. 
2008) (vacating class certification where court erroneously presumed antitrust impact in 
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But looks are deceiving. Suppose that a plaintiff would have bought a 
widget for $10 a unit, the fixed spot price for the widget is $9 a unit, and 
the competitive spot price is $8 a unit. Further suppose that given his 
willingness to pay,232 the plaintiff would have negotiated a contract with 
the seller to buy the widget for $10 a unit, and would have negotiated 
such a contract in both the actual world and the counterfactual world be-
cause he is a poor negotiator. 
If the plaintiff did, in fact, enter into a $10 contract, would he have 
been injured if the spot price had been $8 in the counterfactual world and 
$9 in the actual one? According to the New Motor Vehicles court, the 
answer is no, since the plaintiff would pay a $10 price in both worlds.233 
But what if the plaintiff had the same willingness to pay but simply 
bought at the spot price? In both contexts the buyer faces the risk that the 
spot price may be less or more than his willingness to pay. If he chooses 
to assume the risk and only pay the spot price, he can recover. However, 
if he chooses to avoid the risk and lock in his preferred price ex ante 
through a contract, then he cannot. 
The only relevant difference between the contract context and the spot 
price context is that the contract context allows the plaintiff to memorial-
ize his ex ante preferences. In the spot price context, by contrast, the 
plaintiff can have the same ex ante preferences but simply stay quiet 
about having them in the first place.234 In essence, the baseline method of 
                                                                                                             
price-fixing case, because the evidence suggested that some plaintiffs paid divergent 
prices, and some even paid lower prices, during the class period). 
 232. Admittedly, introducing the concept of “willingness to pay” raises the possibility 
of endowment effects, where an individual’s “willingness to pay” and “willingness to 
accept” the same good may depend on whether the individual already has the good or is 
acquiring it. See RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND 
ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 63–68 (1994). While I acknowledge the effect, it is inde-
pendent of the basic point I am making here, that a more refined focus on a plaintiff’s ex-
ante preferences may reveal that he or she is not injured. 
 233. In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Export Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 29 (1st Cir. 
2008) (noting that poor negotiators may not have been injured since they may have paid 
the same price in both worlds). 
 234. Indeed, the same method of ignoring the ex-ante preferences of the plaintiff arises 
in the securities context, where most plaintiffs are effectively purchasing securities at 
spot prices. Because we seldom have accurate evidence about investors’ willingness-to-
pay, we permit recovery for an overcharge caused by fraud even if the investor would 
have paid for the security at the artificially inflated price, or sold at the artificially de-
pressed price, despite the fraud. I thank David Rosenberg for clarifying my thinking on 
the possibility that ex-ante expectations may vary among the class, leading to situations 
in which some plaintiffs are not, in fact, injured. 
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proving classwide injury avoids counterfactual uncertainty by ignoring 
any uncertainty in each plaintiff’s ex ante preferences.235 
As shown above, the use of presumptions and baselines in the securi-
ties and antitrust contexts may permit uninjured plaintiffs to recover. Be-
cause of presumptions and baselines, plaintiffs in securities fraud cases 
may recover without necessarily relying on the fraud, and plaintiffs in 
price-fixing cases may recover even if they would have paid the same 
price in the absence of the price-fixing conspiracy. 
Although the use of presumptions and baselines in securities and anti-
trust litigation permit courts greater “flexib[ility]” in processing securi-
ties and antitrust claims, they are not necessarily intended to operate in 
other substantive areas.236 According to Nagareda, courts permit the use 
of economic and statistical theories to support presumptions and base-
lines only in contexts where “economics is one with legal doctrine,” such 
                                                                                                             
 235. The ignorance of ex ante expectations becomes clear when one considers the 
possibility of price discrimination in the counterfactual world. Imagine, for example, a 
market in which the price is fixed at $6, the competitive average price would be $5, but a 
seller in a competitive market could engage in some price discrimination. Under this 
scenario, a plaintiff could pay $9 (his willingness-to-pay) in the competitive world, but 
only $6 in the actual world. I thank Fred McChesney for clarifying my thinking on these 
points. Cf. MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, LECTURES IN ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 6–7, 7 n.5 
(2008) (asking “should a merger of competitors that creates a perfectly discriminating 
monopolist that leads to a small increase in productive efficiency be allowed? While such 
a merger raises aggregate surplus it will also make consumers who are not shareholders 
worse off”). Admittedly, perfect price discrimination is impossible in a perfectly com-
petitive market, and in most cases is otherwise illegal under the Robinson-Patman Act. 
See 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2006) (prohibiting, with some exceptions, “any person engaged in 
commerce . . . to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of 
like grade and quality”). But some amount of price discrimination occurs in sufficiently 
competitive markets, such as markets that provide student discounts. 
 236. See Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note 19, at 172 (arguing in favor of a 
context-specific approach since “[a] securities fraud claim is different from an employ-
ment discrimination claim. Each, in turn, differs from an antitrust or RICO claim”). But 
see Samuel Issacharoff, The Vexing Problem of Reliance in Consumer Class Actions, 74 
TUL. L. REV. 1633, 1654 (1999) (suggesting that the use of different standards and pre-
sumptions for proving reliance in some contexts but not others is a reflection of “ongoing 
uncertainty as to the true state of substantive law,” and suggesting that the same standards 
should apply transubstantively). These doctrines could be justified by a preference by 
Congress to vigorously enforce antitrust and securities fraud law, but the Congressional 
preference for vigorous enforcement of at least the securities laws has been cast in doubt 
by the passage of statutes in the late 1990s to limit the use of class actions for securities 
fraud claims. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
353, 112 Stat. 3227–28 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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as securities fraud and antitrust litigation.237 Indeed, other features of an-
titrust and securities law, particularly the direct purchaser rule, which 
explicitly permits noninjured parties to recover,238 suggest that the proce-
dures that apply in antitrust and securities litigation are unique to those 
contexts.239 
But these economic and statistical doctrines are not, in fact, limited to 
certain substantive areas. The difficulty of proving classwide injury can 
be understood as a problem of inferential reasoning—to what extent can 
a court infer causation when it cannot directly compare the actual with 
the counterfactual. Indeed, recent developments in statistics have re-
turned to the common sense notion of “but-for causation with a special 
focus on time.”240 Since the problem of proving facts through inferential, 
or circumstantial, evidence is as old as the law itself, one can view the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption or the use of baseline damages in 
price-fixing cases as variations on common legal techniques for dealing 
with counterfactual uncertainty. 
For example, the fraud-on-the-market presumption is analogous to pre-
sumptions of reliance used for common law fraud claims, which, similar 
to securities fraud claims, are based on “entitlement[s] to rely on repre-
sentations of fact by strangers whether or not there is any reason to trust 
them, because doing so facilitates economic exchange.”241 Likewise, the 
use in the antitrust context of “baseline” damages as a “just and reasona-
ble” inference of damage is no more different than the doctrines used to 
establish “general” damages that are the “foreseeable” and “natural con-
sequences” of the legal violation.242 Indeed, the use of reasonable infer-
                                                                                                             
 237. Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note 19, at 106–07 (noting that in the anti-
trust and securities context, “economics is one with legal doctrine,” and thus competing 
expert testimony “ultimately convey competing accounts of law,” while in the civil RICO 
and employment discrimination context “the integration of legal doctrine and social sci-
ence is still a tentative, contested enterprise”). 
 238. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 492–94 (1968) 
(rejecting “passing on” defense for purposes of challenging standing); Ill. Brick Co. v. 
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 729–36 (1977) (holding that only direct purchasers have standing 
to sue for violations of the federal antitrust laws). 
 239. But see Gilles, supra note 112 (arguing that the direct purchaser rule and the 
availability of punitive damages argues against requiring a showing of ascertainability of 
the plaintiffs). 
 240. Greiner, supra note 70, at 537 (discussing the recent “potential outcomes” statis-
tical approach to establishing causation, which focuses on but-for causation over time). 
 241. Langevoort, supra note 225, at 161 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 111 (7th ed. 2007)). 
 242. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 330 cmt. e, Special Note (1932) (defin-
ing “general” damages as those that are “foreseeable” and the “natural consequence” of 
the breach); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 904 (1939) (same). 
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ences is at work in a case like Klay, where the court permitted a finding 
of common proof of reliance since it “d[id] not strain credulity” that each 
of the doctors relied on the representations of the HMOs.243 
The ignorance of a plaintiff’s ex ante expectations, which is crucial to 
the operation of the fraud-on-the-market presumption and the use of 
baseline damages in antitrust law, is pervasive. Consider a modern, run-
of-the-mill personal injury case. Suppose that a plaintiff purchases a car 
with a defective accelerator244 and sues to recover from the manufacturer 
for any design or manufacturing defect.245 If one takes a New Motor Ve-
hicles approach to the issue of injury, one would focus on the ex ante 
expectations of the plaintiff in purchasing the car. Would the plaintiff 
have purchased the car for the same price had he or she known of the 
defect? Or would the plaintiff have negotiated a lower price in the but-for 
world because of the risk created by the defect? If so, what would the 
plaintiff have been willing to pay for a defect-free car (assuming, of 
course, some modicum of negotiating skill)? Isn’t the real injury the im-
position of an additional risk that the plaintiff would not have accepted in 
the counterfactual world at the price he or she paid? 
In tort litigation involving personal injuries, U.S. courts explicitly re-
ject such “loss of value” claims246 and typically ignore the “expectan-
cies” of the plaintiff altogether.247 Instead, courts presume that, in the 
                                                                                                             
 243. Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 244. E.g., In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, 
& Prods. Liab. Litig., 704 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1381–82 (J.P.M.L. 2010) (ordering transfer 
of actions concerning alleged “sudden, unintended acceleration” defect in Toyota cars for 
consolidation in the Central District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006)). 
 245. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 (1998) (providing for liability for design 
defects, manufacturing defects, and failures to warn). 
 246. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tire Products Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 
1017 (7th Cir. 2002) (Easterbrook, J.) (rejecting claims of breach of implied warranty due 
to defect in tire, noting that “most states would not entertain the sort of theory that plain-
tiffs press”). 
 247. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK ET AL., MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 50 (4th ed. 2010) 
(“The conventional wisdom is that expectancy damages are recoverable only in contract, 
not in tort.”). There are exceptions, most notably in the fraud context. See, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549 (1977) (“The recipient of a fraudulent misrepre-
sentation in a business transaction is also entitled to recover additional damages sufficient 
to give him the benefit of his contract with the maker, if these damages are proved with 
reasonable certainty.”). This exception in the fraud context, especially carved out for 
“business transaction[s],” makes it odd that the McLaughlin Court expressed skepticism 
over whether “expectancies” like the benefit of the bargain are recoverable in the civil 
RICO context. McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 228 (2d Cir. 2008) (not-
ing, without deciding, that “benefit of the bargain” damages “are generally unavailable in 
RICO suits,” relying upon the “business or property” language of the civil RICO statute); 
see also Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1063–65 (E.D.N.Y. 
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absence of the negligence, the plaintiff would not have accepted the ex 
ante risk associated with a defective product. Furthermore, we provide, 
in effect, tort insurance for any actualized harm, rather than compensate 
for the cost of bearing the additional risk.248 Thus, one could imagine 
situations where the plaintiff is not injured because he would have as-
sumed the same risk of harm in the absence of the tort. Ignoring the 
plaintiff’s ex ante preferences to avoid counterfactual uncertainty is not 
limited to exceptional doctrines like the fraud-on-the-market presump-
tion and the baseline damages awarded in price-fixing cases. As demon-
strated by the hypothetical above, it is an everyday feature of tort law. 
3. Deterrence 
Third, the individualist fallacy is mistaken given the commonality of 
the conduct that gives rise to the litigation and the deterrence function of 
the litigation. Courts and scholars insist on proof of classwide injury in 
part because they consider it necessary to prove a common legal viola-
tion. The Court in Wal-Mart illustrates this view. There, the Court con-
cluded that, without proof of classwide injury, the plaintiffs failed to 
provide “convincing proof of a companywide discriminatory pay and 
promotion policy,” and thereby failed to “establish[] the existence of any 
common question.”249 Likewise, Nagareda has argued that the use of 
“aggregate proof” of classwide injury is circular, since it presumes 
“some doctrine in governing law that unites all class members as victims 
of the same wrong.”250 
But the existence of a common wrong does not require common proof 
of injury. Instead, the commonality of the wrong stems from the defend-
ant’s ex ante conduct, which, in all of the above cases, is common to the 
class. In these cases, the defendant necessarily treats the population af-
fected by its conduct as an undifferentiated whole because the defendant 
cannot know who will be affected by its actions prior to committing a 
legal violation.  
                                                                                                             
2005) (Weinstein, J.), overruled by McLaughlin, 522 F.3d 215 (concluding that “benefit 
of the bargain” damages are available in civil RICO claims involving fraud). 
 248. See Bridgestone/Firestone, 288 F.3d at 1017, 1017 n.1 (rejecting “loss of value” 
claims for defective tires, noting that “[i]f tort law fully compensates those who are phys-
ically injured, then any recoveries by those whose products function properly mean ex-
cess compensation,” and showing that recovery for loss of value and recovery for actual-
ized harm add up to the same amount). 
 249. Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011). 
 250. Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note 19, at 129; see also id. at 101 (defining 
“aggregate proof” as proof “that presumes a view of the proposed class in the aggre-
gate”). 
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This can be difficult to conceptualize,251 so consider the disparate 
treatment claim in Wal-Mart. There, the plaintiffs alleged that Wal-
Mart’s hiring and promotion practices contained excessive subjectivity, 
which, combined with its uniform corporate culture, permitted an infer-
ence that Wal-Mart discriminated against women.252 The plaintiffs al-
leged a “disparate treatment pattern-or-practice” claim under Title VII, 
which requires a showing of discriminatory conduct that “is repeated, 
routine, or of a generalized nature” rather than “sporadic discriminatory 
acts.”253 The conduct at issue in Wal-Mart, however, appears to be spo-
radic acts of discrimination, since it involved the thousands of discrete 
pay and promotion decisions made by Wal-Mart’s store, district, and re-
gional managers.254 
But suppose, for example, that Wal-Mart adopted the practice de-
scribed above, but is deciding whether to add a checklist that store man-
agers must use in making pay and promotion decisions. The checklist is 
designed to avoid biases based on gender and thus would decrease Wal-
Mart’s Title VII expected liability. Wal-Mart, of course, cannot predict 
the checklist’s future effects on specific female employees, but it can 
estimate its effects over the affected female employee population. In fact, 
Wal-Mart may intentionally refuse to adopt a checklist given its animus 
towards its female employees. 
The Title VII claim in Wal-Mart is, in essence, that Wal-Mart inten-
tionally decided not to impose measures like a checklist to reduce any 
gender disparities.255 That allegedly discriminatory decision would be 
common to the class, even though the effects of that decision were not.256 
Moreover, the claim in Wal-Mart does not presuppose any novel theories 
                                                                                                             
 251. See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 652 (9th Cir. 2010) (en 
banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (noting that the plaintiffs “have little in common but their 
sex and this lawsuit.”), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541; see also Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557 
(quoting Judge Kozinski’s dissent with approval). I briefly discuss the common violation 
in Wal-Mart in Campos, supra note 27, at 1070–71, although I discuss it in more detail 
here. 
 252. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2548. 
 253. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336, 336 n.16 (1977) 
(defining disparate treatment pattern-or-practice claims as claims that concern conduct 
that “is repeated, routine, or of a generalized nature,” where plaintiffs must prove “more 
than sporadic acts of discrimination”). 
 254. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 146–47 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 255. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2548. 
 256. Dukes, 603 F.3d at 600–12 (concluding that the plaintiffs’ evidence “provide[s] 
sufficient support to raise the common question whether Wal-Mart’s female employees 
nationwide were subjected to a single set of corporate policies” which violated Title VII) 
(emphasis in original). 
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of Title VII liability. It is no more circular than alleging a legal violation 
that you intend to prove later. The claim simply alleged “discrimi-
nate[ion] in the old-school, intentional sense,” albeit on a much larger 
scale.257 In fact, in Falcon, the Court previously conceded that plaintiffs 
could bring a Title VII class action “if the discrimination manifested it-
self in hiring and promotion practices in the same general fashion, such 
as through entirely subjective decisionmaking processes.”258 
The same can be said of a number of legal wrongs that are common to 
the class but involve differentiated conduct. One example is the fraudu-
lent mass marketing campaign in McLaughlin, which relied on retailers 
selling cigarettes to individual consumers. Another is the alleged hori-
zontal anticompetitive conspiracy in New Motor Vehicles, which relied 
on dealerships negotiating car prices with buyers. 
The commonality of the defendant’s ex ante conduct is crucial to un-
derstanding why accuracy as to each individual’s injury is unnecessary to 
fulfill the deterrence function of the litigation. In general, liability rules 
deter misconduct because the defendants seek to avoid or reduce their 
expected liability.259 For example, in New Motor Vehicles, the litigation 
would deter the defendants only if the prospect of any liability would 
have affected their decision to engage in the conspiracy in the first place. 
In this way the litigation affects the defendant’s ex ante decision making 
even though the litigation occurs after the violation. 
If the deterrence function arises from the effect of the expected litiga-
tion on the defendant’s ex ante conduct, then accurate proof of each 
plaintiff’s individual injury is unnecessary. All that is needed is an accu-
rate assessment of the aggregate liability caused by the defendant’s con-
duct because the defendant will only consider its aggregate expected lia-
bility in deciding how to act. The defendant cannot base its actions on a 
more fine-grained determination of the effects of its conduct on individu-
al plaintiffs because in cases like New Motor Vehicles and McLaughlin, a 
defendant cannot know ex ante how its classwide conduct will specifical-
ly affect each potential plaintiff. 
                                                                                                             
 257. Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note 19, at 155. That is why Richard Na-
gareda is incorrect in concluding that the claim in Wal-Mart is only that Wal-Mart “ena-
ble[d] discrimination.” Id. at 153. Rather, the plaintiffs took great pains to allege that the 
Wal-Mart itself engaged in intentional discrimination. Nagareda further criticizes the 
proof of such discrimination, calling it “startlingly inept,” id. at 155, but that is a merits 
inquiry as to whether there was a wrong at all. Inept proof of a common wrong does not 
transform a common wrong into an individual one. 
 258. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982). 
 259. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970) (discussing the 
deterrence function of liability rules); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
ACCIDENT LAW (1987) (same). 
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Moreover, determining the defendant’s aggregate liability does not de-
pend on an accurate determination of each plaintiff’s injury. In theory, 
the individual injuries of each plaintiff could be summed up to provide 
an assessment of the aggregate damages. But, as noted above, an assess-
ment of damages at the individual level may lead to significant error as 
well as significant underreporting, which can bias the result. More im-
portantly, many statistical methods, most notably the use of random 
sampling, can approximate the aggregate amount of damages with far 
greater accuracy than the summing up of individual injuries.260 In fact, 
the district court in McLaughlin mentioned the benefits of random sam-
pling in approving a procedure for determining aggregate damages.261 
Admittedly, the deterrence function of the liability does not obviate the 
need to determine each individual’s damages. But the deterrence function 
of the litigation does show that the determination of individual injury and 
damage is of secondary importance, such that it should not be a relevant 
factor in determining class certification. The failure to certify a class in 
small claims cases like New Motor Vehicles and McLaughlin would re-
sult in the suboptimal imposition of aggregate liability on the defendant. 
Again, that is because the class action corrects for the asymmetric stakes 
between the plaintiffs and the defendant. These asymmetric stakes lead 
to the defendant investing more in common issues, which ultimately re-
sult in the skewing of the defendant’s ex ante aggregate liability in its 
favor.262 In fact, given that in small claims litigation no individual plain-
tiff would bring suit, the absence of a class action means that a defendant 
avoids its ex ante expected liability altogether.263 
Accordingly, the failure to certify a class in cases like New Motor Ve-
hicles and McLaughlin would not only lead to no recovery for the plain-
tiffs, but permit the defendants to commit the same legal violations with 
                                                                                                             
 260. In fact, the McLaughlin court’s conclusion that an inaccurate determination of 
individual damages would taint a classwide determination of damages suffers from a 
fallacy of composition. By envisioning instances in which the plaintiffs would not recov-
er, they assume that the group as a whole would be reflective of those examples. But one 
cannot infer population-based statistics like aggregate loss from individual statistics like 
individual injury, at least not in the absence of procedures like random sampling to avoid 
biases. See Greiner, supra note 70, at 563 (noting that “[r]andom assignment assures that, 
in the absence of bad luck, units who receive one treatment are not systematically differ-
ent from those who receive the other treatment”). 
 261. Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1244–46 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005) (Weinstein, J.), overruled by McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d 
Cir. 2008). 
 262. See supra Part II.B. (discussing the problem of asymmetric stakes). 
 263. See, e.g., David Betson & Jay Tidmarsh, Optimal Class Size, Opt-Out Rights, and 
“Indivisible Remedies,” 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 542, 546, 562 (2011). 
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impunity. The relevant trade-off is not between the deterrence provided 
by the class action and the accuracy provided by the individual trial. The 
trade-off is between optimal deterrence and imperfect compensation ver-
sus no deterrence and compensation at all. 
I want to conclude by emphasizing the private interest the plaintiffs 
have in deterrence. Many scholars have correctly noted the public inter-
est in the enforcement of the law provided by deterrence.264 But the 
plaintiffs themselves have an interest in preventing the unlawful viola-
tion from occurring and would have personally benefitted from a class 
action rule that, among other things, did not require a showing of class-
wide injury. Such a rule would have likely deterred the defendant from 
committing the wrong in the first place. 
The litigation admittedly occurs after the legal violation has occurred, 
when nothing can be done about it. Unfortunately, we never address the 
effect of the class action rule when the defendant is considering its con-
duct ex ante, as we do with injunctions or other ex ante enforcement 
mechanisms. Instead, we have a vicious cycle of ignoring the deterrent 
effect of procedure, imposing suboptimal liability, causing more legal 
violations, ignoring the deterrent effect of the procedure, and so on. 
To break this vicious cycle, courts should consider the counterfactual 
of the effect of the class action on the defendant’s ex ante conduct.265 
Accordingly, we need to not only consider the compensatory interests of 
the plaintiffs after the legal violation has occurred, but also the ex ante 
effects of the procedure before the violation, since it is the type of con-
sideration that is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”266 Indeed, 
this counterfactual, ex ante inquiry is of paramount importance because 
most, if not all, plaintiffs would prefer to avoid the unlawful conduct 
than to suffer it and receive compensation, no matter how accurate the 
compensation would be. 
III. AGAINST COMMON ANSWERS 
It follows from the above that I am against requiring proof of “com-
mon answers” as to each plaintiff’s injury to certify a class action. The 
requirement of proof of common injury arises, in part, from a trend by 
circuit courts to require proof of each of the requirements of Rule 23 by a 
“preponderance of the evidence,” even if such proof would overlap with 
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the merits.267 The trend is largely justified because many of the class cer-
tification requirements of Rule 23 require factual findings by the court, 
particularly the “preponderance” requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).268 As put 
by Judge Easterbrook, “[t]he proposition that a district judge must accept 
all of the complaint’s allegations when deciding whether to certify a 
class cannot be found in Rule 23 and has nothing to recommend it.”269 
Nevertheless, both the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) and 
the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) merely require a finding 
of common “questions,” not common answers, and for such a finding the 
pleadings are more than sufficient.270 The class action prevents the de-
fendant from using its greater stakes to invest more on common issues 
than the plaintiffs. Thus, a class action should be certified once common 
issues are present to allow the plaintiffs to invest in these issues on a lev-
el playing field, regardless of whether all issues are amenable to common 
resolution. Requiring more to certify a class, particularly a showing of 
likelihood of success on the merits, would frustrate the function of the 
class action and the substantive areas of the law that utilize it.271 
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I am also against common answers in another importance sense. The 
class action has garnered interest from other jurisdictions as a supple-
ment to law enforcement, particularly the use of class actions for the type 
of small claim, consumer litigation discussed above. For example, the 
European Union has proposed the increased use of class actions to en-
force conduct in violation of its anti-competition and consumer protec-
tion laws.272 Mexico has also recently passed a statute that allows for 
class action procedures to “help consumers challenge companies that 
overcharge for goods and services and that fail to meet quality stand-
ards.”273 Class action procedures have also been proposed or utilized in 
Asia.274 
In discussing the class action, this Article recognizes that the collective 
procedures adopted or proposed in other countries may differ in material 
ways. It also recognizes that the legal and social context of the United 
States also differs from other jurisdictions. 
Nevertheless, in adopting, designing, or implementing a class action 
procedure courts should consider at least three factors, which roughly 
track the three fallacies discussed above. These factors are by no means 
exhaustive. However, they are important because the fallacies that lead to 
doctrines such as the requirement of proof of classwide injury may undu-
ly influence other jurisdictions. If anything, the goal of this Article is to 
ensure that other jurisdictions learn from the United States’ mistakes. 
First, and as shown by the all-at-once fallacy, the primary function of 
the class action in the United States is not to realize savings in adjudicat-
ing claims all-at-once. Instead, the function of the class action is to cor-
rect what can be called a Coasean problem in U.S. law.275 Because the 
private entitlement to bring a cause of action is initially assigned to each 
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individual victim to recover his or her own damages, it can result in 
asymmetric stakes situations when a defendant engages in common con-
duct that injures a large number of dispersed victims. The class action is 
needed in the United States because it allows the plaintiffs in these situa-
tions to avoid easily predictable collective action problems, which oth-
erwise would allow the defendant to escape some or all of its liability. 
Accordingly, the utility of a class action in other jurisdictions will de-
pend on the extent to which the assignment of causes of action leads to 
the type of collective action problems that arise in the United States. For 
example, one feature of U.S. law that leads to collective action problems 
is restrictions on the selling of claims under the law of champerty and 
maintenance. In essence, a victim can sell a claim only if the claim has 
accrued, and even then, only to the defendant through a settlement.276 But 
if a jurisdiction allows for greater freedom in the selling of claims, then 
plaintiffs may not be as disadvantaged relative to the defendant. Alt-
hough the defendant, again, owns a monopoly in the defense of its liabil-
ity, plaintiffs may be able to sell their claims to an entity277 or, perhaps, 
to an insurer via subrogation,278 thereby substantially lessening any 
asymmetric stakes between the parties. 
Moreover, the class action arises in the United States because of gaps 
in public enforcement. Thus, a jurisdiction considering the use of the 
class action must also consider how to coordinate such private enforce-
ment with public enforcement. In many cases the use of private enforce-
ment and public enforcement may be complementary, such as the use of 
private rights of action to supplement ex ante regulation.279 
In other cases, however, public and private enforcement may be at 
cross-purposes. Somewhat ironically, in the securities fraud and antitrust 
contexts in the United States, public enforcement through liability is in-
evitably followed by private actions, leading to significant overdeter-
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rence.280 In these contexts the “title” to bring and dispose of claims can 
be understood as a license granted by the government to enforce. Under-
stood in this way, the class action is a type of “qui tam” or “bounty 
hunter” procedure that assigns the license (plus an interest in any sanc-
tion) to an uninjured party.281 Consequently, the issue for any policy 
maker is whether a private license to enforce can peacefully coexist with 
a public enforcer. This is not to say that ex post liability actions by both 
public enforcers and private enforcers are substitutes for each other. In-
stead, a jurisdiction has to be careful in designing both private and public 
enforcement to take advantage of their comparative advantages.282 
Second, and as suggested by the extraordinary remedy fallacy, jurisdic-
tions should not flinch given the size of the class or the amount of the 
liability at stake. The impulse to engage in a “likelihood of success” in-
quiry when the liability is large is understandable, particularly when 
class certification could result in the bankruptcy of the defendant. But it 
is important to recognize that the liability itself is not a function of the 
class action. Instead, it is a function of mass production, since many of 
the cases discussed, particularly the Wal-Mart case, arise from activities 
taken by the defendant at a very large scale. To limit liability based on 
the scale of the conduct at issue would effectively provide one strategic 
technique a company can use to avoid liability, similar to judgment 
proofing or using subordinates to commit wrongdoing. There may be 
reasons to limit the liability of large-scale activities, but the sheer magni-
tude of the liability should not be one of them, particularly when the lia-
bility could equally arise from many defendants instead of one. 
Third, and as suggested by the individualist fallacy, jurisdictions 
should not lose sight of the objectives of the litigation. In the United 
States, courts and scholars have been preoccupied with protecting both 
the plaintiffs’ rights in their causes of action and the defendant’s defense 
rights.283 But in the United States, and presumably elsewhere, the func-
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tion of private rights of action is to deter potential defendants from com-
mitting legal violations in the first place.284 It makes little sense to restrict 
class actions out of a respect for the litigation rights of the parties when 
they would undermine the purpose of those rights. Consequently, courts 
should not deny a class action out of a concern for accuracy as to indi-
vidual injury. Not only is such accuracy unnecessary, but, as shown in 
the cases above, it would lead to the very legal violations for which the 
plaintiffs seek compensation. 
CONCLUSION 
One cause of the requirement of proof of classwide injury is the reluc-
tance of courts to utilize exceptional procedures like the class action. 
Although the American litigation model is itself exceptional, the class 
action is even more so because it is the great exception to the “principle 
of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not 
bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not desig-
nated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of 
process.”285 This reluctance is, in turn, a reflection of the humility of U.S. 
courts, which recognize that other institutions may be better equipped to 
handle the policy considerations that underlie the class action. Such hu-
mility has its virtues, but not in all cases. The class action is itself “‘an 
invention of equity . . . mothered by the practical necessity’ of providing 
a practical procedure to enable large numbers of litigants to enforce their 
common rights.”286 After all, and as noted by Judge Weinstein in the 
McLaughlin litigation, it is also a principle of general application in U.S. 
law that “every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every 
injury its proper redress.”287 
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